Quotes from Robin Neillands

it would probably be more accurate, far more fair, and more useful to posterity, to blame the nations at large for drifting into this war without any true understanding of what a modern war would be like. The excuse that they did not know may - just - be valid for 1914, but by 1916 it should have been very clear, certainly to the political leaders, that the war could not be 'won' in any meaningful way.

The pre-Great War British Army, with a world-wide empire to protect, could only muster a total of 11 regular divisions, the same as the Balkan state of Serbia

The French Army expended more artillery ammunition in September 1914 than it had done in the whole of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. Total French production of the 75 mm shell in 1914 amounted to 14,000 shells a day, at a time when one single battery of 75 mm guns could easily shoot off 1,000 shells a day.

There were not enough guns and, as a result, their fire was too widely dispersed. Gas, so useful in other attacks, not least to deter the enemy gunners, was not employed in this bombardment, except for a small amount from French 75 mm guns. Many British guns were outranged by many German guns. The ammunition was all too often faulty, either failing to go off or sometimes exploding in the barrels of the guns. The weight of shot was not enough to penetrate the deep German dugouts

the large numbers attacking in the early hours of 1 July - 64 battalions, mostly in line - was of no advantage, since they simply offered a large target to the enemy guns. As a result, this 'extended line' formation was blown away in a matter of minutes, after which the survivors advanced, if at all, in small parties, dodging from crater to crater, a tactic which should arguably have been adopted from the start.

The generals were now two years into this war and it should have been - and indeed was - glaringly apparent that the methods being employed to attack the enemy lines, be they British, French or German, were simply not working. Increasing the scale of the attack by the current methods simply increased the number of casualties

it is difficult not to wonder what the outcome would have been if the Entente had simply held its ground in France and Belgium and tackled Germany and Austria-Hungary by sending every piece of kit they could spare to the Russians - which is not unlike what happened until 1944 in the Second World War.

In August 1914, the BEF mustered two corps totalling four divisions (plus a cavalry division) from an Army which, at full strength, could muster eleven divisions. When the Battle of the Somme opened two years later, on 1 July 1916, the BEF could muster 58 divisions in 18 corps organized in four armies

Every man who could be found and trained had to be committed to the struggle for, even at the end of 1914, the notion that a lack of momentum could be compensated for by weight, or numbers, still held sway in military circles.

French losses, from August 1914 to 31 December 1915, came to 1,932,051 of whom no less than 1,001,271 were killed or missing. The British total in the same period was 512,420, of whom around 200,000 were killed or missing.

Von Falkenhayn's plan for Verdun, however flawed in execution, was at least possible; he did not intend to gain ground, penetrate the enemy defences or take Verdun. He simply wanted to kill soldiers, to bleed the French Army to death. The Anglo-French Somme plan, even if it had not been disrupted and reduced by the Verdun offensive, was a far more risky business, with little chance of achieving its objectives without new tactical ideas and new equipment.

It should be noted that the Battle of Loos, fought when and where the French wished, was a total shambles, costing a great number of British and French lives, but this catastrophe and all the others since the war began had clearly not dented the French belief in their military infallibility.

the capture of Douaumont took less than four hours and cost the 24th Brandenburg Regiment just 32 men killed and 40 wounded. It was later estimated that French losses resulting from the fall of Douaumont, or incurred in its recapture many months later, amounted to around 100,000 men.

When evidence reached Joffre's ears that the men were complaining, that untenable positions were being given up or that attacks were not being pressed home with their former élan, his answer was not to question Nivelle or his own methods, but to call for courts martial and firing squads.

What the French gained from this slaughter of their Allies is not immediately apparent, but the British generals failed to learn that they must stand up to the French. Throwing away their men's lives simply to bolster French egos or to demonstrate British commitment to the common cause was little short of criminal.

In the second week of June, two second-lieutenants were shot by firing squads drawn from their own companies, for allegedly failing to press home their attacks. Orders also went out that battalions abandoning positions or retiring during an attack were to be fired on by their own machine-guns or bombarded by French artillery. Some of these orders were actually obeyed but the resentment they caused far outweighed the influence they had on the front-line soldier.

The defence of Verdun and the French Republic was a splendid cause but that alone was not enough; it needed to be a two-way commitment - and what did the Republic care for them, the infantry soldiers of France, alone and dying in their shell holes, sent in again and again in attacks that withered away under the shelling and machine-gun fire, achieving nothing? By mid-June the murmurs heard among the troops in May were growing louder.

Morale is a fragile thing. Its creation and maintenance are among the most important duties that can fall to a commander and neither Joffre nor Nivelle devoted as much thought to this issue as it deserved. Morale is maintained by a wide range of means: by discipline and training, by good leadership, by organization, by caring for the wounded, by regular reliefs

The private soldiers of France were not well treated during the Great War; compared with their lot, the soldiers of the other armies on the Western Front were blessed with good food, reliable mail, adequate pay, frequent reliefs and regular leave.

Not so the French poilu. His pay was meagre, his food disgusting - though his wine was drinkable - his leave infrequent, letters from home often failed to arrive, and his life was all too often thrown away in frontal attacks that usually achieved nothing but an extensive casualty list. Much of this was simply due to poor staff work, to incompetence rather than indifference

most of the French generals were, indeed, totally indifferent to the welfare of the men, provided the attacks went in.

by electing to hold Verdun, de Castelnau was doing exactly what von Falkenhayn wanted. He was opting to hold a position that could only be defended at a great cost in lives. The fact that it was to cost Germany as many men as France would prove a poor consolation; Germany had more men to lose.

Italy also demanded that Britain should fund Italy's part in the war and provide the Italian Army with artillery.

The British Army was learning how to fight the 'all-arms' battle by this stage of the war; no longer would the brunt be left to the infantry.