Quotes from Ben S. Bernanke

The race was on to find a solution, but neither Bill nor I had anything concrete yet to report.

I was warned not to comment in public on policy issues or to speak to the press.

him Bear was in danger of not having the cash to meet its obligations

which seemed the right decision given what we knew then.

I agree that more should have been done to help homeowners, although devising effective policies to do that was more difficult than many appreciate.

In fact, despite my understated style, I was as aggressive on this issue as on any during my time in Washington.

Easygoing, thoughtful, and without ego, Don was a Federal Reserve System veteran.

and I tried to come up with something we could do to cushion the blow at least a little.

There was also substantial sentiment at the meeting in favor of holding our fire until we had a better sense of how the Lehman situation would play out.

The timing alone argues against that hypothesis.

it became a truly deep recession only after the panic reached its peak, in September and October 2008.

The leadership of the Fed (especially the Chairman) must get aggressive.

With Don's and my arrival, the Board was at full strength, with all seven seats filled.

JPMorgan was unwilling on its own to stand behind it.

something that I had been advocating since I arrived at the Fed in 2002. In

They flattened out in 2006 but did not decline much initially

could help convince markets that policy would remain easy for as long as needed to return inflation to our target.

In the end, despite some frictions, I

I found him to be smart and very tough. (His heavy New York accent contributed to that impression.)

How much of Citi's troubles could be blamed on Pandit is debatable;

Tim's departure would be a significant loss to the Fed.

They remained basically flat through 2011 before starting to recover.

and stood ready to serve as a lender of last resort if needed.

Bear seemed unlikely to make it through the day without help.