Quotes from Ben S. Bernanke

In that sense, a Lehman-type episode was probably inevitable.

Not all the news was positive.

There wasn't time to draw up new documents.

Nevertheless, I do not want the notion that Lehman's failure could have been avoided, and that its failure was consequently a policy choice, to become the received wisdom, for the simple reason that it is not true.

European recovery remained elusive.

We did everything we could think of to avoid it.

They also were unable to find an exact precedent in earlier financial crises that could serve as a model. During

although the European banks that eagerly bought securitized subprime loans were hardly blameless.)

Europe's leaders hoped not only to promote growth but also to increase political unity,

an inflation rate low enough that households and businesses did not take it into account when making economic decisions.

was asking Michelle to pass on his message.

since Hank would be the one persuading Congress to act, his views deserved some deference.

My relationship with Corker was complicated by frequent policy disagreements.

Larry is known for being blunt, to put it mildly, and he seemed to be warning against rescuing Bear.

WE HAD A PLAN; the next step was to sell it.

He sought my views on a range of topics

They didn't resist, but they saw the idea as a low political priority.

Greenspan had come to the same conclusion.

the increasing hostility of Republicans to the Fed and to me personally troubled me,

The economy seemed to pick up for a few months, but by the time of our March 2003 meeting the recovery again seemed stalled. Shockingly,

What changed Dimon's mind about acquiring Bear?

They condemned bailouts as giveaways of taxpayer money without considering the broader economic consequences of the collapse of systemically important firms.

He told me that the Fed should do what it believed necessary.

My colleagues and I also were uncertain about the economic consequences of the war, especially its effect on energy prices.