Quotes from Erwin Chemerinsky

The Supreme Court ruled that the governor was not protected by absolute immunity, but could claim qualified immunity: "the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, . . . affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers.

Scheuer test for qualified immunity thus contained both an objective component (was the act reasonable?) and a subjective component (did this officer believe in good faith that it was reasonable?).

The Supreme Court, though, found that conducting the lineup without the presence of a lawyer violated Wade's right to counsel.

police officers have absolute immunity when they testify as witnesses, even when they commit perjury and even when their perjured testimony results in the conviction of an innocent person.

and all criminal defendants—are entitled to have their attorney present at lineups that occur after there has been an indictment. The Court forcefully stated that there "is grave potential for prejudice, intentional or not, in the pretrial lineup, which may not be capable of reconstruction at trial.

The issue was whether the exclusionary rule applies when police commit an illegal search based on good faith reliance on erroneous information from another jurisdiction. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the 5–4 majority, held that the exclusionary rule does not apply and that the evidence was properly admitted against Herring.

post-indictment lineup is a critical stage of the proceeding and that a criminal defendant has as much right to an attorney there as at the trial itself.

The Court held that the exclusionary rule may be applied only if police intentionally or recklessly violate the Fourth Amendment or only if police department violations with regard to searches and seizures are systemic.

Instead, the Court's conservative majority that already wanted to limit the exclusionary rule issued a sweeping decision that evidence never has to be excluded if the police violate the Fourth Amendment in good faith or through negligence.

subsequent in-court identification by that witness also is inadmissible unless the government can demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification was based on the observations of the accused independent of the prior lineup identification.

Roberts went even further and said that the exclusionary rule applies only where the value of deterring police misconduct outweighs the costs of releasing a potentially guilty person:

legislation was passed to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance, or otherwise," states were likely to violate constitutional rights, and hence a federal forum was needed to enforce the Constitution.4

The very purpose of §1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights—to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.

Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under color of' state law."19

The Court explicitly rejected the argument that the government had to show that the consent to a search had to involve a person's "knowing" waiver of his or her rights.

But why not, especially since the usual test for a waiver of one's rights is whether it is knowing as well as voluntary? Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, said candidly that that would make it too hard for police to conduct searches. He said that two competing concerns had to be balanced: law enforcement's need to perform such searches and the desire to prevent coercion.

In every case since then, without exception, the Court has rejected people's ability to sue federal officers.

Proof of knowledge of the right to refuse consent, Justice Stewart wrote, is not "a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a 'voluntary' consent."6

Justice Stewart wrote that the way the search was done had nothing to do with the reliability of the evidence.

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte is important on many levels. First, it dramatically empowers police to be able to search. It obviates the need for police to meet all the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, such as the need for probable cause (or at least reasonable suspicion) and the need for a warrant. It is estimated that consent searches comprise over 90 percent of all warrantless searches.

Justice Scalia wrote for the Court that former attorney general Ashcroft was protected by qualified immunity because there was no clearly established law that his conduct was unconstitutional.

Brown v. Allen, decided in 1953, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, held that a constitutional claim may be raised on habeas even though it had been raised, fully litigated, and decided in state court.

Stone v. Powell in 1976, the Court concluded that Fourth Amendment claims that had been raised and decided in state courts could not be heard in federal habeas corpus review.

marginally, if at all, by allowing exclusionary rule claims to be raised on habeas corpus.44 Moreover, the Court stressed the costs of the exclusionary rule in permitting guilty defendants to go free and in undermining respect for the criminal justice system.45