Quotes from Henry Kissinger

um conjunto de regras de aceitação geral que define os limites de ação aceitáveis, e um equilíbrio de poder que impõe a contenção quando as regras são violadas, impedindo que determinada unidade política venha a subjugar as outras.

The ability to enable people to gather in a square differs from building new institutions of state.

Neither [side] should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

Em período de convulsões generalizadas, um país onde seja preservada a autoridade doméstica fica em boa posição para explorar o caos dos Estados vizinhos em benefício de objetivos internacionais mais elevados.

China as the present-day economic superpower is the legacy of Deng Xiaoping.

elemento indispensável do sucesso de uma política externa é uma estratégia de longo prazo fundada numa análise rigorosa de todos os fatores relevantes.

Porque a mera repetição do que é familiar conduz à estagnação, não é pouca a audácia exigida.

ofrecerles elevados edificios, graneros y esclavos para enviciar sus barrigas […] y, para los que iban a rendirse, el emperador [debería] favorecerlos haciéndoles los honores con una recepción imperial en la que el propio emperador les sirviera vino y comida para enviciar su mente. Estos son los que podrían denominarse los cinco cebos.27

We shouldn't be afraid of atomic bombs and missiles. No matter what kind of war breaks out—conventional or thermonuclear—we'll win. As for China, if the imperialists unleash war on us, we may lose more than three hundred million people. So what? War is war. The years will pass, and we'll get to work producing more babies than ever before.27

É a pureza, e não a estabilidade, o princípio fundador desta conceção de ordem mundial.

A insistência impensada em fazer o que é certo pode virar desculpa para deixar de pensar em todas as consequências das políticas, afirma ele. As pessoas que querem usar o poder para mudar o mundo são com frequência idealistas, apesar de os realistas serem vistos mais comumente como pessoas dispostas a usar a força.

The leaders on both sides of the Pacific have an obligation to establish a tradition of consultation and mutual respect so that, for their successors, jointly building a shared world order becomes an expression of parallel national aspirations.

Every great achievement was a vision before it became a reality. In that sense, it arose from commitment, not resignation to the inevitable.

la dependencia de la coerción es síntoma de un liderazgo inadecuado

the PAP's first nine years in power, Lee set aside nearly one-third of Singapore's budget for education Ã¢â'¬â€œ an astonishing proportion in relation to neighboring countries, or indeed any country in the world.[59]

Russian rulers appealed to their people on the basis of their endurance, not their greatness. Russian diplomacy relied, to an extraordinary extent, on superior power. Russia rarely had allies among countries where it had not stationed military forces. Russian diplomacy tended to be power-oriented, tenaciously holding on to fixed positions and transforming foreign policy into trench warfare.

Quando os Estados não são governados em toda a sua extensão é a própria ordem internacional ou regional que começa a desintegrar-se.

Good character does not assure worldly success, or triumph in statecraft, but it does provide firm grounding in victory and consolation in failure.

When information is contextualized, it becomes knowledge. When knowledge compels convictions, it becomes wisdom. Yet the internet inundates users with the opinions of thousands, even millions, of other users, depriving them of the solitude required for sustained reflection that, historically, has led to the development of convictions.

Para el líder, la gestión del riesgo es tan crítica como la capacidad de análisis.

What remains to be dealt with is to move from crisis management to a definition of common goals, from the solution of strategic controversies to their avoidance. Is it possible to evolve a genuine partnership and a world order based on cooperation? Can China and the United States develop genuine strategic trust?

If the Emperor strayed from the path of virtue, All Under Heaven would fall into chaos. Even natural catastrophes might signify that disharmony had beset the universe. The existing dynasty would be seen to have lost the "Mandate of Heaven" by which it possessed the right to govern: rebellions would break out, and a new dynasty would restore the Great Harmony of the universe.19

Quanto à questão da necessidade de derrubar a ordem mundial vigente, islamitas de ambos os lados da trincheira – sunitas e xiitas – estão geralmente de acordo.

In other words, each side could arm itself with whatever ideological slogans fulfilled its own domestic necessities, so long as it did not let them interfere with the need for cooperation against the Soviet danger. Ideology would be relegated to domestic management; it took a leave from foreign policy. The ideological armistice was, of course, valid only so long as objectives remained compatible.