Quotes from Thomas Reid

A philosopher is, no doubt, entitled to examine even those distinctions that are to be found in the structure of all languages... in that case, such a distinction may be imputed to a vulgar error, which ought to be corrected in philosophy.

It is a question of fact, whether the influence of motives be fixed by laws of nature, so that they shall always have the same effect in the same circumstances.

Every conjecture we can form with regard to the works of God has as little probability as the conjectures of a child with regard to the works of an adult.

And, if we have any evidence that the wisdom which formed the plan is in the man, we have the very same evidence, that the power which executed it is in him also.

There is no greater impediment to the advancement of knowledge than the ambiguity of words.

In every chain of reasoning, the evidence of the last conclusion can be no greater than that of the weakest link of the chain, whatever may be the strength of the rest.

But when, in the first setting out, he takes it for granted without proof, that distinctions found in the structure of all languages, have no foundation in nature; this surely is too fastidious a way of treating the common sense of mankind.

If there is anything that can be called genius, it consists chiefly in the ability to give that attention to a subject which keeps it steadily in the mind, till we have surveyed it accurately on all sides.

Every conjecture we can form with regard to the works of God has as little probability as the conjectures of a child with regard to the works of a man.

For, until the wisdom of men bear some proportion to the wisdom of God, their attempts to find out the structure of his works, by the force of their wit and genius, will be vain.

Every indication of wisdom, taken from the effect, is equally an indication of power to execute what wisdom planned.

The rules of navigation never navigated a ship. The rules of architecture never built a house.

The rules of navigation never navigated a ship. The rules of architecture never built a house.

There is no greater impediment to the advancement of knowledge than the ambiguity of words.

Every indication of wisdom, taken from the effect, is equally an indication of power to execute what wisdom planned.

And, if we have any evidence that the wisdom which formed the plan is in the man, we have the very same evidence, that the power which executed it is in him also.

Let scholastic sophisters entangle themselves in their own cobwebs; I am resolved to take my own existence, and the existence of other things, upon trust; and to believe that snow is cold, and honey sweet, whatever they may say to the contrary. He must either be a fool, or want to make a fool of me, that would reason me out of my reason and senses.

If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the' constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life,' without being able to give a reason for them; these are what we call the principles of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call absurd.

The chain is only as strong as its weakest link, for if that fails the chain fails and the object that it has been holding up falls to the ground.

I confess I know not what a sceptic can answer to this, nor by what good argument he can plead even for a hearing; for either his reasoning is sophistry, and so deserves contempt; or there is no truth in the human faculties, and then why should we reason?

Philosophy has no other root but the principles of common sense.; it grows out from them, and draws its nourishment from them; severed from this root, its honours wither up, its sap is dried up, it dies and rots.

In every chain of reasoning, the evidence of the last conclusion can be no greater than that of the weakest link of the chain, whatever may be the strength of the rest.

Nature hath given us us a particular emotion, to wit, that of ridicule, which seems intended for this very purpose of putting out of countenance what is absurd, either in opinion or practice. This weapon, when properly applied, cuts with as keen an edge as argument. Nature has furnished us with the first to expose absurdity; as with the last to refute error.

Those who reject some principle of common sense in speculation, find themselves under necessity of being governed by it in their practice. A skeptic may struggle hard to disbelieve the information of his senses, as a man does to swim against the torrent; but ah! it is in vain...For after all, when his strength is spent in the fruitless attempt, he will be carried down the torrent with the common herd of believers.