Quotes from Benjamin Graham

Security analysis cannot presume to lay down general rules as to the proper value of any given common stock... The prices of common stocks are not carefully thought out computations, but the resultants of a welter of human reactions.

On December 7, 1999, Kevin Landis, portfolio manager of the Firsthand mutual funds, appeared on CNN's Moneyline telecast. Asked if wireless telecommunication stocks were overvalued—with many trading at infinite multiples of their earnings—Landis had a ready answer. "It's not a mania," he shot back. "Look at the outright growth, the absolute value of the growth. It's big.

the really dreadful losses" always occur after "the buyer forgot to ask 'How much?

According to tradition the sound reason for increasing the percentage in common stocks would be the appearance of the "bargain price" levels created in a protracted bear market. Conversely, sound procedure would call for reducing the common-stock component below 50% when in the judgment of the investor the market level has become dangerously high.

This chapter will begin with two pieces of advice to the investor that cannot avoid being contradictory in their implications. The first is: Don't take a single year's earnings seriously. The second is: If you do pay attention to short-term earnings, look out for booby traps in the per-share figures. If our first warning were followed strictly the second would be unnecessary.

But in other cases, making allowance for conversion rights—and the existence of stock-purchase warrants—can reduce the apparent earnings by half, or more.

While it seems easy to foresee which industry will grow the fastest, that foresight has no real value if most other investors are already expecting the same thing.

Adequate size. A sufficiently strong financial condition. Continued dividends for at least the past 20 years. No earnings deficit in the past ten years. Ten-year growth of at least one-third in per-share earnings. Price of stock no more than 1½ times net asset value. Price no more than 15 times average earnings of the past three years.

December 20, 1999, Juno Online Services unveiled a trailblazing business plan: to lose as much money as possible, on purpose. Juno announced that it would henceforth offer all its retail services for free—no charge for e-mail, no charge for Internet access—and that it would spend millions of dollars more on advertising over the next year. On this declaration of corporate hara-kiri, Juno's stock roared up from $16.375 to $66.75 in two days.6

If you want to put money in investment funds, buy a group of closed-end shares at a discount of, say, 10% to 15% from asset value, instead of paying a premium of about 9% above asset value for shares of an open-end company. Assuming that the future dividends and changes in asset values continue to be about the same for the two groups, you will thus obtain about one-fifth more for your money from the closed-end shares.

Many Internet IPOs rose 1,000% or more in 1999 and early 2000; most of them lost more than 95% in the subsequent three years. How could these early gains earned by a few investors justify the massive destruction of wealth suffered by the millions who came later? Many IPOs were, in fact, deliberately underpriced to "manufacture" immediate gains that would attract more attention for the next offering.

A reduction in common-stock holdings where needed to bring it down to a maximum of 50 per cent of the total portfolio. The capital-gains tax must be paid with as good grace as possible, and the proceeds invested in first-quality bonds or held as a savings deposit.

Instead of listening to Hoffman and his lapdog analysts, traders should have heeded the honest warning in Commerce One's annual report for 1999: "We have never been profitable. We expect to incur net losses for the foreseeable future and we may never be profitable.

The soundness of the best investments must rest not upon legal rights or remedies but upon ample financial capacity of the enterprise.

The fault, dear investor, is not in our stars- and no in our stocks- but in ourselves...

In all of these instances he appears to be concerned with the intrinsic value of the security and more particularly with the discovery of discrepancies between the intrinsic value and the market price.

the readers to buy their stocks as they bought their groceries, not as they bought their perfume

savings and time deposits, savings-and-loan-association accounts, life insurance, annuities, and real-estate mortgages or equity ownership.

The essence of proper bond selection consists, ... in obtaining specific and convincing factors of safety in compensation for the surrender of participation in profits.

personas que tienen unos ingresos fijos en términos monetarios sufrirán cuando el coste de la vida aumente

Lucent's stock, at $51.062 on June 30, 2000, finished 2002 at $1.26—a loss of nearly $190 billion in market value in two-and-a-half years.

I have little confidence even in the ability of analysts, let alone untrained investors, to select common stocks that will give better than average results. Consequently, I feel that the standard portfolio should be to duplicate, more or less, the DJIA.

The stock market's performance depends on three factors: real growth (the rise of companies' earnings and dividends) inflationary growth (the general rise of prices throughout the economy) speculative growth—or decline (any increase or decrease in the investing public's appetite for stocks)

No borrowing to buy or hold securities. No increase in the proportion of funds held in common stocks. A reduction in common-stock holdings where needed to bring it down to a maximum of 50 per cent of the total portfolio. The capital-gains tax must be paid with as good grace as possible, and the proceeds invested in first-quality bonds or held as a savings deposit.