Quotes from Immanuel Kant

are—and yet refer to something permanent, which must, therefore, be distinct from all my representations and external to me, the existence

Söylediklerimizden çok, söylemediklerimize piÅŸman oluruz. Dile getirilmemiÅŸ düÅŸünce ; gidilmemiÅŸ yoldur.

I]f I know that it is only by this process that the intended operation can be performed, then to say that if I fully will the operation, I also will the action required for it, is an analytical proposition...

Agisci in modo da considerare l'umanità, sia nella tua persona, sia nella persona di ogni altro, sempre anche come scopo, e mai come semplice mezzo.

Out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made

For human reason, without any instigations imputable to the mere vanity of great knowledge, unceasingly progresses, urged on by its own feeling of need, towards such questions as cannot be answered by any empirical application of reason, or principles derived therefrom; and so there has ever really existed in every man some system of metaphysics.

We are enriched by not what we posses, but by what we can do without.

We have no reason for assuming the form of such a thing to be still partly dependent on blind mechanism, for with such confusion of heterogeneous principles every reliable rule for estimating things would disappear.

El sabio puede cambiar de opinión. El necio, nunca.

Philosophy may be said to contain the principles of the rational cognition that concepts

160Any change makes me apprehensive, even if it offers the greatest promise of improving my condition, and I am persuaded by this natural instinct of mine that I must take heed if I wish that the threads which the Fates spin so thin and weak in my case to be spun to any length. My great thanks, to my well-wishers and friends, who think so kindly of me as to undertake my welfare, but at the same time a most humble request to protect me in my current condition from any disturbance.

Was nicht ein Gegenstand der Erfahrung sein kann, dessen Erkenntniß wäre hyperphysisch, und mit dergleichen haben wir hier gar nicht zu thun, sondern mit der Naturerkenntniß, deren Realität durch Erfahrung bestätigt werden kann, on sie gleich a priori möglich ist und vor aller Erfahrung hervorgeht.

The essence of things is not altered by their external relations, and that which, abstracting from these, alone constitutes the absolute worth of man is also that by which he must be judged, whoever the judge may be, and even by the Supreme Being.

Man's greatest concern is to know how he shall properly fill his place in the universe and correctly understand what he must be in order to be a man.

But this is a wretched subterfuge, by which some people still allow themselves to defer the issue, and think that by a little fiddling with words they have solved that difficult problem on the solution of which thousands of years have worked in vain, and which therefore can hardly be found so completely on the surface.

Footnote: The real morality of actions—their merit or demerit, and even that of our own conduct, is completely unknown to us. Our estimates can relate only to their empirical character. How much is the result of the action of free will, how much is to be ascribed to nature and to blameless error, or to a happy constitution of temperament (merito fortunae), no one can discover, nor, for this reason, determine with perfect justice.]

Metaphysics is a dark ocean without shores or a lighthouse

The sight of a being who is not adorned with a single feature of a pure and good will, enjoying unbroken prosperity, can never give pleasure to an impartial rational spectator. Thus a good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition even of being worthy of happiness.

We know nothing but our manner of perceiving [objects], a manner which is peculiar to us, and not necessarily shared by every being, even though it must be shared by every human being.

Out of the crooked timber of humanity, no truly straight thing was ever made.

An appeal to the consent of the common sense of mankind cannot be allowed, for that is a witness whose authority depends merely upon rumor. Says Horace: Quodcunque ostendis mihi sic, incredulus odi.

We cannot think a line without drawing it in thought; we cannot think a circle without describing it; we cannot represent, at all, the three dimensions of space without placing, from the same point, three lines perpendicularly to one another; we cannot even represent time, except by attending, while drawing a straight line [...]

the understanding is capable of being instructed by and equipped with rules, the power of judgement is a special talent which cannot be taught, but can be practised. This is why power of judgement is the specific mark of our so-called native wit, the absence of which cannot be remedied by any schooling.

It is not time that passes, but the existence of what is changable that passes in time.