Quotes from Tony Judt

here, it was not until the mid-1970s that a new generation of conservatives felt emboldened to challenge the 'statism' of their predecessors and offer radical prescriptions for dealing with what they described as the 'sclerosis' of over-ambitious governments and their deadening impact upon private initiative.

the Union's democratic deficit could easily turn from unconcern into hostility, into a sense that decisions were being taken 'there' with unfavourable consequences for us 'here' and over which 'we' had no say: a prejudice fuelled by irresponsible mainstream politicians but fanned by nationalist demagogues.

What exactly is a 'gated community' and why does it matter?

Above all, the new Left—and its overwhelmingly youthful constituency—rejected the inherited collectivism of its predecessor.

Shanghai—the term denotes people who have gathered together into affluent subdivisions of suburbs and cities and fondly suppose themselves functionally independent of the rest of society.

The only democracies left in continental Europe were the tiny neutral states of Sweden and Switzerland, both dependent on German goodwill.

But it was the very reassurance that such men held out to their own constituency that allowed them to dismantle the authoritarian institutions they had once loyally served. And they, in turn, were succeeded by Socialists—Soáres, González, Papandreou—who convincingly reassured their own supporters of their unbroken radical credentials while implementing moderate and often unpopular economic policies forced upon them by circumstances.

For three decades following the war, economists, politicians, commentators and citizens all agreed that high public expenditure, administered by local or national authorities with considerable latitude to regulate economic life at many levels, was good policy.

Conservatism—not to mention the ideological Right—was a minority preference in the decades following World War II.

admix of superiority and ressentiment. Thus, in the same way that so many of the classics of modern English literature are in fact Irish, so some of the greatest achievements of English-language political and social thought since the Enlightenment, from David Hume to Adam Smith and on to John Stuart Mill and beyond, were actually Scottish.

But today, they are everywhere: a token of 'standing', a shameless acknowledgment of the desire to separate oneself from other members of society, and a formal recognition of the state's (or the city's) inability or unwillingness to impose its authority across a uniform public space.

Why, after decades of internal violence and foreign aggression, did the world's first Socialist society implode without even trying to defend itself? One answer, of course, is that it never really existed in the first place: that, in the words of the historian Martin Malia, 'there is no such thing as socialism, and the Soviet Union built

The limitations of geography, demography and resources which have kept Scotland dependent upon the UK are still there;

When the Labour Party returned to office in 1974 and called a referendum on UK membership of the Community, the country approved by 17,300,000 to 8,400,000. But even Heath could not make the British—the English especially—'feel' European, and a significant share of voters on Right and Left alike continued to doubt the benefits of being 'in Europe'.

Nothing, of course, is ever quite as good as we remember. The social democratic consensus and the welfare institutions of the postwar decades coincided with some of the worst town planning and public housing of modern times. From Communist Poland through

where the 'Chicago boys' got their ideas, we shall find that the greatest influence was exercised by a handful of foreigners, all of them immigrants from central Europe: Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, Joseph Schumpeter, Karl Popper, and Peter Drucker.

Hence the famous bon mot of Lord Ismay, who took up his post as NATO's

Democracies in which there are no significant political choices to be made, where economic policy is all that really matters—and where economic policy is now largely determined by nonpolitical actors (central banks, international agencies, or transnational corporations)—must either cease to be functioning democracies or accommodate once again the politics of frustration, of populist resentment.

In an age when young people are encouraged to maximize self-interest and self-advancement, the grounds for altruism or even good behavior become obscured. Short of reverting to religious authority—itself on occasion corrosive of secular institutions—what can furnish a younger generation with a sense of purpose beyond its own short-term advantage?

There is a widespread sense that since 'they' will do what they want in any case—while feathering their own nests—why should 'we' waste time trying to influence the outcome of their actions.

privatization reverses a centuries-long process whereby the state took on things that individuals could not or would not do.

All five were profoundly shaken by the interwar catastrophe that struck their native Austria.

But never again—and this was the true lesson of 1968, first for the Czechs but in due course for everyone else—never again would it be possible to maintain that Communism rested on popular consent, or the legitimacy of a reformed Party, or even the lessons of History.

usually without giving the matter too much thought, we see ourselves as part of a civic community transcending generations.