Quotes from Jan Willem Honig

When Karremans made this comment on 23 July 1995, he clearly did not yet realize what horrific fate had befallen men of Srebrenica. He was not alone in underestimating savagery of the Bosnian Serbs. Few people had expected them to attempt a full-scale annihilation of the men of Srebrenica. ....

The most fundamental dillemma of all, which the international community to its detriment never resolved was a moral one. How could one combine moral imperative to alleviate suffering with the moral imperative not to let agression pay? Was it right to have opposed ethnic cleansing and instituted safe areas in eastern Bosnia, if one was unwilling to put one`s life at risk to protect people in those areas?....

Although Mrs Albright stopped calling for further air strikes she still lamely insisted that the UN Sec General should consider cost of backing down in the face of Bosnian Serbs.

as for the Clinton administration, it pursued a high moralistic policy for which it was totally unwilling to accept responsibility. It insisted particularly in the UN, on tougher action against the Serbs, but refused to support it with American ground troops.

Smith proposed not to use air power, but to employ an ad hoc group to open Mount Igman road into Sarajevo. This was the last attempt (in Split) he made to come out on top in the face-off with the Bosnian Serbs. Again, Janvier rejected his proposal....."We are a peacekeeping mission. We do not have the option of going to war. We are not authorized to do so. It is not our mandate

Albright and Biegman told Janvier that while the status quo was untenable and a more effective and robust UNPROFOR required, she could not accept a withdrawal from safe areas, nor could she accept abandoning weapons collection points. The mandate she said should be strengthened not reduced. As past experience indicated, only a resolute UN would get its way.

Having publicly made a clear distinction between aggressors - the Serbs and victims - the Bosnians - from the moment they took office, they had stuck to this line ever since. Their credibility would be in doubt and their reputations damaged if they were not to give public approval to a territorial swap involving eastern enclaves.

Opposing redeployment US and Dutch ambassadors were making more robust action impossible.

Ambassador Albright reportedly threatened to resign over what she called "softly-softly" pact with Miloševi?.