Quotes from Wolfgang Smith

It is difficult, almost impossible, in fact, for the scientific community to recognize the fact that Cartesian bifurcation is a philosophic postulate, for which there is absolutely no scientific basis [...] It is not that they can conceive or imagine a scientific proof of that hypothesis; it is rather that they are unable to conceive that it might not be true.

Yes, it is indeed by way of the mathematical forms that the physicist gains knowledge of the external world; Eddington's point, however, is that the forms in question have been artificially imposed: "The mathematics is not there until we put it there." And it is for this reason, and in this sense, that our knowledge of mathematical structures—our knowledge of the physical world!—is said to be subjective.

The so-called physical universe—"the world so described"—turns out to be constituted by mathematical structures which we ourselves have imposed; in a word, it proves to be "man-made." Yet this way of putting it is also misleading; for inasmuch as physical knowledge is partly objective, "the world so described" must be "partly objective" as well. One is left with a curiously equivocal conception, which may enlighten the wise but is bound to deceive the unwary

A growing number of respectable scientists are defecting from the evolutionist camp.....moreover, for the most part these "experts" have abandoned Darwinism, not on the basis of religious faith or biblical persuasions, but on strictly scientific grounds, and in some instances, regretfully.

THE DIFFICULTIES AND INDEED PERPLEXITIES which beset us the moment we try to make philosophic sense out of the findings of quantum theory are caused, not just by the complexity and subtlety of the microworld, but first and foremost by an adhesion to certain false metaphysical premises, which have occupied a position of intellectual dominance since the time of René Descartes.

There is reason to believe that, to some extent at least, the physical universe is actually 'constructed' by the intervention of the physicist, which is the reason John Wheeler refers to it as 'the participatory universe', and why Heisenberg states that physics deals, not with Nature as such, but with 'our relations to Nature'.

Descartes himself, as one will recall, experienced great difficulty in overcoming his celebrated doubts, and was able to do so only by way of a tortuous argument which few today would find convincing. Is it not strange that tough-minded scientists should have so readily, and for so long, espoused a rationalist doctrine which calls in question the very possibility of empirical knowledge?

It is safe to say that with the discovery of DNA around the middle of the last century Darwinism was in effect disqualified as a scientific theory. With the publication moreover of Dembski's 1998 theorem regarding 'complex specified information' it has been rigorously disproved on mathematical grounds, and thus reduced from a bona-fide scientific hypothesis to the status of a sociological phenomenon.

What saves the day for physics ... is the fact that the experimentalist does not accept the Cartesian philosophy, which is to say that he treats his apparatus not as a mathematical structure, but as a perceivable object. Even as there are said to be 'no atheists in the trenches', so indeed there are no bifurcationists in the laboratory. All knowledge of the external world begins in the perceptible realm: deny the perceptible object, and nothing external remains.

Even the tiniest plant that blooms for a fortnight and then is seen no more is vaster in its metaphysical roots than the entire cosmos in its visible form: for these roots extend into eternity. And how much more does this apply to man! "Before I formed thee in the womb, I knew the" (Jer. 1:5)