Quotes About Science

The world is a very strange place, and there are times when the metaphorical or narrative description characteristic of culture and the material representation so integral to science appear to touch, when everything comes together—when life and art reflect each other equally.

The scientific world of matter can be reduced, in some sense, to its fundamental constituent elements: molecules, atoms, even quarks. However, the world of experience has primal constituents, as well. These are the necessary elements whose interactions define drama and fiction. One of these is chaos. Another is order. The third (as there are three) is the process that mediates between the two, which appears identical to what modern people call consciousness.

Before the dawn of the scientific worldview, reality was construed differently. Being was understood as a place of action, not a place of things.31 It was understood as something more akin to story or drama. That story or drama was lived, subjective experience, as it manifested itself moment to moment in the consciousness of every living person.

Ideologies are simple ideas, disguised as science or philosophy, that purport to explain the complexity of the world and offer remedies that will perfect it. Ideologues are people who pretend they know how to "make the world a better place" before they've taken care of their own chaos within. (The warrior identity that their ideology gives them covers over that chaos.)

The "world" of the Sumerians was not objective reality, as we presently construe it. It was simultaneously more and less—more, in that this "primitive" world contained phenomena that we do not consider part of "reality," such as affect and meaning; less, in that the Sumerians could not describe (or conceive of) many of those things that processes of science have revealed to us. Myth is not primitive proto-science. It is a qualitatively different phenomenon.

This principle is sometimes known as Price's law, after Derek J. de Solla Price,13 the researcher who discovered its application in science in 1963.

Ideologies are simple ideas, disguised as science or philosophy, that purport to explain the complexity of the world and offer remedies that will perfect it.

Because we are so scientific now—and so determinedly materialistic—it is very difficult for us even to understand that other ways of seeing can and do exist. But those who existed during the distant time in which the foundational epics of our culture emerged were much more concerned with the actions that dictated survival (and with interpreting the world in a manner commensurate with that goal) than with anything approximating what we now understand as objective truth.

Materialist social science implied that we could divide the world into facts (which all could observe, and were objective and "real") and values (which were subjective and personal). Then we could first agree on the facts, and, maybe, one day, develop a scientific code of ethics (which has yet to arrive).

Moreover, by implying that values had a lesser reality than facts, science contributed in yet another way to moral relativism, for it treated "value" as secondary. (But the idea that we can easily separate facts and values was and remains naive; to some extent, one's values determine what one will pay attention to, and what will count as a fact.)

Before the dawn of the scientific worldview, a mere six hundred years ago, reality was construed as all that which human beings experience.

Scientific truths were made explicit a mere five hundred years ago, with the work of Francis Bacon, René Descartes and Isaac Newton. In whatever manner our forebears viewed the world prior to that, it was not through a scientific lens (any more than they could view the moon and the stars through the glass lenses of the equally recent telescope).

Carl Jung hypothesized that the European mind found itself motivated to develop the cognitive technologies of science—to investigate the material world—after implicitly concluding that Christianity, with its laser-like emphasis on spiritual salvation, had failed to sufficiently address the problem of suffering in the here-and-now.

Before the work of Georg Cantor in the nineteenth century, the study of the infinite was as much theology as science; now, we understand Cantor's theory of multiple infinities, each one infinitely larger than the last, well enough to teach it to first-year math majors. (To be fair, it does kind of blow their minds.)

Nowadays, the Abrahamic argument—just look at everything, how could it all be so awesome if there weren't a designer behind it?—has been judged wanting, at least in most scientific circles. But then again, now we have microscopes and telescopes and computers. We are not restricted to gaping at the moon from our cribs. We have data, lots of data, and we have the tools to mess with it.

People often complain that no one likes facts and numbers and reason and science anymore, but as someone who talks about those things in public, I can tell you that's not true. People love numbers, and are impressed by them, sometimes more than they should be.

Assessing the scale of the p-hacking problem is not so easy—

the interesting thing about the slime mold is that it makes pretty good decisions.

But the significance test that scientists use doesn't measure importance.

Antiwater would look and feel and behave the same way as regular water except that if you drank it you would explode in a blinding flash of light, which, we admit, would be antirefreshing.

Yes, those ten-billion-dollar twenty-seven-kilometer-long machines are good for more than just finding bosons named after Peter Higgs.

Nap?íklad na urychlení jednoho párátka zhruba na 10 procent rychlosti sv?tla byste pot?ebovali raketu s nádrží v?tší než Jupiter.

Today's philosophy questions are tomorrow's precision science experiments.

Hoy la ciencia ya ha demostrado que «el hábito es la gran herramienta de la memoria y, por lo tanto, también del talento, que es su criatura» (José Antonio Marina dixit).