Quotes About Mistakes

el brusco despertar no fue lo que ella había dicho, sino la constatación de que los adultos pueden equivocarse, pueden ser estúpidos, ineptos y holgazanes en su labor, y que no siempre te creen aunque les estés contando la verdad. Y cuando estas personas estúpidas e ineptas que no ven más allá de sus narices tienen poder sobre ti, cuando no se creen lo que les estás contando, pueden ocurrir cosas malas

No matter how big you are, you will trip over yourself.

Making mistakes simply means you are learning faster.

Always forgive, but never forget, else you will be a prisoner of your own hatred, and doomed to repeat your mistakes forever.

People will listen a great deal more patiently while you explain your mistakes than when you explain your successes.

Gençler her zaman hakl?d?r, ben eminim bundan, hakl? de?ilseler de haklar? vard?r. ?unu demek istiyorum: Kendi tecrübelerini edinmeye sonuna kadar haklar? vard?r. Kötü tecrübeler olsa bile bunlar, ders ç?kar?rlar.

We all make mistakes, but intelligence enables us to do it on purpose.

Examples of the planning fallacy abound in the experiences of individuals, governments, and businesses. The list of horror stories is endless.

best we can do is a compromise: learn to recognize situations in which mistakes are likely and try harder to avoid significant mistakes when the stakes are high. The premise of this book is that it is easier to recognize other people's mistakes than our own.

learn to recognize situations in which mistakes are likely and try harder to avoid significant mistakes when the stakes are high. The premise of this book is that it is easier to recognize other people's mistakes than our own.

Why be concerned with gossip? Because it is much easier, as well as far more enjoyable, to identify and label the mistakes of others than to recognize our own.

Lo mejor que podemos hacer es llegar a un compromiso: aprender a reconocer situaciones en las que los errores sean probables y esforzarnos en evitar errores importantes cuando están en juego cosas de primer orden. La premisa de este libro es que es más fácil reconocer los errores de otros que los nuestros.

In contrast, Meehl and other proponents of algorithms have argued strongly that it is unethical to rely on intuitive judgments for important decisions if an algorithm is available that will make fewer mistakes.

The premise of this book is that it is easier to recognize other people's mistakes than our own.

The best we can do is a compromise: learn to recognize situations in which mistakes are likely and try harder to avoid significant mistakes when the stakes are high. The premise of this book is that it is easier to recognize other people's mistakes than our own.

continuous vigilance is not necessarily good, and it is certainly impractical. Constantly questioning our own thinking would be impossibly tedious, and System 2 is much too slow and inefficient to serve as a substitute for System 1 in making routine decisions. The best we can do is a compromise: learn to recognize situations in which mistakes are likely and try harder to avoid significant mistakes when the stakes are high.

The decision of whether or not to protect individuals against their mistakes therefore presents a dilemma for behavioral economists. The economists of the Chicago school do not face that problem, because rational agents do not make mistakes. For adherents of this school, freedom is free of charge.

time meet a patient who shares a disturbing tale of multiple mistakes in his previous treatment. He has been seen by several clinicians, and

Meehl and other proponents of algorithms have argued strongly that it is unethical to rely on intuitive judgments for important decisions if an algorithm is available that will make fewer mistakes.

judgments of similarity and probability are not constrained by the same logical rules. It is entirely acceptable for judgments of similarity to be unaffected by base rates and also by the possibility that the description was inaccurate, but anyone who ignores base rates and the quality of evidence in probability assessments will certainly make mistakes.

System 2 is much too slow and inefficient to serve as a substitute for System 1 in making routine decisions. The best we can do is a compromise: learn to recognize situations in which mistakes are likely and try harder to avoid significant mistakes when the stakes are high.

Our predilection for causal thinking exposes us to serious mistakes in evaluating the randomness of truly random events.

Errors are bound to occur when a judgment of similarity is substituted for a judgment of probability

The best we can do is a compromise: learn to recognize situations in which mistakes are likely and try harder to avoid significant mistakes when the stakes are high.