Quotes About Author

Hank's lifetime of contacts in the financial services industry came in handy here.

I submitted it to a publisher and received a kind, encouraging rejection letter.

asking them to refrain from media interviews.

we didn't like to be dependent on Treasury's help in setting monetary policy.

Thousands of letters of protest poured in,

My assignment to the consumer committee reflected my lack of seniority, but I didn't object.

But, to my chagrin, either I misunderstood Hank or he and his staff changed course.

Philosophically, I did not view myself as either strongly pro- or anti-regulation.

These principles should be more broadly applied in Washington.

the PDCF carried some stigma

Paul still carried considerable influence in policy circles,

had been an indispensable adviser to both Greenspan and me.

Moreover, Fuld and his team seemed in denial about how badly their bets had gone wrong.

were growing increasingly skeptical of Lehman's judgment of the value of its holdings.

Not surprisingly, this voluntary arrangement was less strict than one required by law might have been.

Larry had been critical of some of our actions as well,

Tim was the Fed's principal contact with Fuld.

The deepest frustration we shared, it soon became clear, was not with the baggage but with government dysfunction itself.

I didn't want to influence his choice too much, since my support for any one candidate could easily be misrepresented as opposition to another.

I thought we should be willing to offer advice, at least in private, if it would be helpful and

To me, the need for continuing with these purchases remained clear.

Low-quality mortgages ended up imperiling the entire financial system—not so much because of the direct losses on the mortgages themselves, which were significant but likely manageable, but because of the securitization boom, which carved those mortgages into securities that became a ubiquitous form of currency and collateral throughout the system.

I expressed no preference for whether the stimulus should take the form of tax cuts, spending increases, or both.

First, I suggested, instead of continuing to hold out the vague promise about deflationary concerns subsiding,