Quotes About Philosophy

Now in matters of action the reason directs all things in view of the end:

Faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected.

I answer that, Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as being, has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act implies some sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability and goodness, as is clear from A[1]. Hence it follows that every being as such is good.

A capacity as such is directed to an act. Wherefore we seek to know the nature of a capacity from the act to which it is directed, and consequently the nature of a capacity is diversified as the nature of the act is diversified.

So if the ultimate felicity of man does not consist in external things which are called the goods of fortune, nor in the goods of the body, nor in the goods of the soul according to its sensitive part, nor as regards the intellective part according to the activity of the moral virtues, nor according to the intellectual virtues that are concerned with action, that is art and prudence – we are left with the conclusion that the ultimate felicity of man lies the contemplation of truth.

Thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. cap. ult.) that "there is no kind of multitude that is not in a way one. But what are many in their parts, are one in their whole; and what are many in accidents, are one in subject; and what are many in number, are one in species; and what are many in species, are one in genus; and what are many in processions, are one in principle." Reply to Objection 3: It does not follow that it is nugatory to say "being" is "one"; forasmuch as "one" adds an idea to "being.

sin embargo, el conocimiento más delgado que se puede obtener de las cosas más altas es más deseable que el conocimiento más cierto obtenido de las cosas menores

Happiness itself, being a perfection of the soul, is a good inherent in the soul: but that in which happiness consists, or the object that makes one happy, is something outside the soul.

But the perfection of divine goodness is found in one simple thing

The act that anything evil puts forth is due to the strength of goodness, but a deficient goodness. For if there were nothing of good there, neither would there be any being, nor any action: again, if the goodness were not deficient, neither would there be any evil.

Esto es parte de la bondad infinita de Dios, que Él debe permitir que el mal exista, y de él se produzca el bien.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion 14) that "evil exists only in good.

We now inquire into the place of the angels. Touching this there are three subjects of inquiry: (1) Is the angel in a place? (2) Can he be in several places at once? (3) Can several angels be in the same place?

Unde omnis lex humanitus posita intantum habet de ratione legis, inquantum a lege naturae derivatur. Si vero in aliquo a lege naturali discordet, iam non erit lex sed legis corruptio.

Objection 1: It would seem that there are more than three persons in God. For the plurality of persons in God arises from the plurality of the relative properties as stated above (A[1]). But there are four relations in God as stated above (Q[28], A[4]), paternity, filiation, common spiration, and procession. Therefore there are four persons in God.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8): "Love for others comes of love for oneself.

This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.

Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x), "things which are diverse are absolutely distinct, but things which are different differ by something.

that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors. Whereas man's whole salvation, which is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation. It was therefore necessary that besides philosophical science built up by reason, there should be a sacred science learned through revelation.

The root of liberty is the will as the subject thereof; but it is the reason as its cause. For the will can tend freely towards various objects precisely because the reason can have various perceptions of the good. Hence, philosophers define free-decision as being a free judgment arising from reason, implying that reason is the cause of liberty.

Yet no-one can say that God has not a Word, for it would follow that God is most foolish.

Hence, if the movement of the heavens lasted always, time would not be of its measure as regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is not measurable; but it would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning and end in time.

Dios es la primera causa

Whether, besides Philosophy, any Further Doctrine Is Required? Objection 1: It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no need of any further knowledge. For man should not seek to know what is above reason: "Seek not the things that are too high for thee" (Ecclus. 3:22). But whatever is not above reason is fully treated of in philosophical science. Therefore any other knowledge besides philosophical science is superfluous.