Quotes About Morality

Freedom is a property of the will which is realized through truth. Freedom is given to man as a task to be accomplished.

Tolerance is the last virtue of a dying society

For it is about our actions that we deliberate and inquire, and all our actions have a contingent character; hardly any of them are determined by necessity.

But what matters for questions of virtue and vice is whether your acts are not merely voluntary but also chosen.

For we don't wish to know what bravery is but to be brave, not what justice is but to be just, just as we wish to be in health rather than to know what health is

Let us now turn to their circumstances and their victims. People do wrong, then, when they think that the deed can be done, and can be done by them — which is to say that they think either† (a) they can get away with it, or (b) that if they are caught they will avoid punishment, or (c) that if they are punished the penalty paid by themselves or those they care for will be less than their profits.

Virtue is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on defect.

Tolerance and Apathy are the last virtues of a dying society

It is plain then that the wicked man cannot be in the position of a friend even towards himself, because he has in himself nothing which can excite the sentiment of Friendship. If then to be thus is exceedingly wretched it is a man's duty to flee from wickedness with all his might and to strive to be good, because thus may he be friends with himself and may come to be a friend to another.

Halk y???nlar? aldat?ld?klar? zaman kendilerini kötü ÅŸeyler yapmaya özendirenlere kar?? kin besler.

For moral excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains; it is on account of pleasure that we do bad things, and on account of pain that we abstain from noble ones. Hence we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought; for this is the right education.

One who surpasses his fellow-citizens in virtue is no longer a part of the city. Their law is not for him, since he is a law to himself.

Gustavo Solivellas dice: Aquellos que educan bien a los niños deberían ser más honorados que los que los producen; los primeros solo les dan la vida, los segundos el arte de vivir bien (Aristóteles)

Men may be bad in many ways, But good in one alone.

From whence it is evident, that those who seek for what is just, seek for a mean; now law is a mean.

But Justice, it must be observed, is a mean state not after the same manner as the forementioned virtues, but because it aims at producing the mean, while Injustice occupies both the extremes.

By choiceworthy in themselves are meant those from which nothing is sought beyond the act of Working: and of this kind are thought to be the actions according to Virtue, because doing what is noble and excellent is one of those things which are choiceworthy for their own sake alone.

Again he urged that that is most choiceworthy which we choose, not by reason of, or with a view to, anything further; and that Pleasure is confessedly of this kind because no one ever goes on to ask to what purpose he is pleased, feeling that Pleasure is in itself choiceworthy. Again, that when added to any other good it makes it more choiceworthy; as, for instance, to actions of justice, or perfected self-mastery; and good can only be increased by itself.

IX Now that Moral Virtue is a mean state, and how it is so, and that it lies between two faulty states, one in the way of excess and another in the way of defect, and that it is so because it has an aptitude to aim at the mean both in feelings and actions, all this has been set forth fully and sufficiently.

When people are friends, they have no need of justice, but when they are just, they do need friendship in addition; and in the realm of the just things, the most just seems to be what involves friendship.

For [people] are good18 in one way, but in all kinds of ways bad

baseness that does not possess its own starting point [or principle] is always less harmful than that which does possess it, and intellect is such a starting point. It

Neither by nature, therefore, nor contrary to nature are the virtues present; they are instead present in us who are of such a nature as to receive them, and who are completed1 through habit.

Happiness above all seems to be of this character, for we always choose it on account of itself and never on account of something else. Yet honor, pleasure, intellect, and every virtue we choose on their own account—for even if nothing resulted from them, we would choose each of them—but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, because we suppose that, through them, we will be happy.