Quotes About Pakistan

During my time, squash was not even part of Asian or Commonwealth Games. Considering the dominance of Jansher Khan and I in the '80s and '90s, it goes without saying that Pakistan would have bagged a plethora of medals through us at these games. And yes, the ultimate prize would have been an Olympic gold.

I seek to lead a democratic Pakistan which is free from the yoke of military dictatorship and that will cease to be a haven, the very petri dish of international terrorism.

The interaction between human rights campaigners from Pakistan and India was a big taboo in the 1980s. When we started traveling to India to increase people-to-people contact between the two nations, we knew that we would face serious repercussions back home.

The way the Pak government treated me is only testimony to the ill treatment meted out to artistes. There was outrage against me. People were amazed that I had applied for citizenship in India. I don't give a damn about getting trolled. I have earned immense respect and love in India.

I would like to clarify that our opposition to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is not related to any consideration involving Pakistan. Our position on this important issue is consistent and principled. We are not ready to sign the NPT as it stands today because it is blatantly discriminatory in character.

the United States constructed its most active regional counterterrorism partnerships with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, despite evidence that both governments had been penetrated by al Qaeda.

By 2001, however, India was decoupling from its long rivalry with Pakistan. India's economy was booming. Its generals and foreign policy strategists professed to be more concerned about China than about their dysfunctional sibling neighbor to the west. Yet the Pakistan Army used fear of India as a justification for dominating Pakistan's politics.

The C.I.A. subcontracted its aid to the Afghan rebels through Pakistan's main spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, or I.S.I. By 1989, the service had grown into a powerful, corrosive force within Pakistan, a shadowy deep state that manipulated politics on behalf of the army and increasingly promoted armed groups of Islamists, including the Arab volunteers we had learned to approach cautiously. I.S.I. officers were not easy to meet, but not impossible to track down, either.

To enlarge Pakistan's sphere of influence in Afghanistan during the 1990s, Directorate S covertly supplied, armed, trained, and sought to legitimize the Taliban.

Lute believed that no political agreement with the Taliban, if one could be achieved at all, would be sustainable without Pakistan's participation, even though Tayeb Agha had insisted that the Taliban wanted to negotiate independently with the United States, free from I.S.I. pressure.

Amal moved into a rented two-story home in Naseem Town, a suburb of Haripur, Pakistan. The area was in Pakistan's Pashtun-dominated western province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Musharraf told Wendy Chamberlin at Army House that a postwar government in Afghanistan, in addition to being "pro-Pakistan," should also be "Pashtun dominated."15 For two decades, I.S.I. had tried to control Islamist Pashtun parties to influence Afghan politics; it was not about to stop now.

Bin Laden taunted them openly. He met near the Pakistan border in early June with Bakr Atiani, a reporter for a Saudi-owned satellite television network. "They said there would be attacks against American and Israeli facilities within the next several weeks

The Afghans primarily blamed Pakistan. The sanctuary the Taliban enjoyed in Pakistan as they regrouped empowered them. Afghans wondered, reasonably: How could the United States fail to see that I.S.I. was up to its old tricks?

And a new generation of Pakistan Army officers was rising under Musharraf, schooling itself in the arts of "yes, but" with the United States. Among them was Ashfaq Kayani, a mumbling, chain-smoking general who, even more than Musharraf, would shape America's fate in South Asia in the decade to come.

The military-industrial complex was one of Pakistan's binding forces, alongside Islam, national pride, suspicion of India and America, and cricket. One common narrative about Pakistan held that its powerful army competed for power with civilian political families like the Bhuttos and the Sharifs.

The Coalition Support Funds provided a kind of legal bribery to Pakistan's generals. Musharraf and his lieutenants could use the cash for legitimate military purposes, or they could spread it around as they wished.

Karzai believed that Pakistan should be the main effort of the American war. As Eikenberry once put it to him, "If you had a choice about where to deploy thirty thousand new American troops, you would put five thousand into training Afghan forces, five thousand along the border with Pakistan, and twenty thousand in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas," inside Pakistan.

Afghans believe that if their country is to be sold to Pakistan they would prefer to bargain over the price directly rather than rely on an agent," meaning the United States, Rubin wrote.17

Was it conceivable that Bin Laden could live so close to the army's highest seat of officer education for six years without anyone in uniform or in I.S.I. being aware of his presence? Kayani later insisted that it was the case. The compound was not actually visible from the academy. Pakistanis did not routinely get to know their neighbors in the way that many Americans did, he argued to American visitors.

The potency of Al Qaeda's ideas and tactics further challenged a Pakistani state that was weak, divided, complacent, and complicit about Islamist ideology and violence. These consequences were not fully apparent that December, but they would rapidly metastasize.

The expiring Bush administration was divided between those "who saw Pakistan as totally lost," as the State Department's David Gordon put it, and those "who had the view that they're complicit, but there's a chance this could turn out better.

Obama was new to Afghanistan but he had personal connections to Pakistan. As a college sophomore in Los Angeles, he had shared an apartment with a Pakistani friend, Hasan Chandoo, a business-minded Shiite from a prosperous Karachi family. Obama visited Pakistan with Chandoo and made other Pakistani friends as he came of age and later entered Harvard Law School.

With apparent sincerity, he added, "No intelligence organization of Pakistan is capable of indoctrinating a man to blow himself up."21