Quotes About Ben S. Bernanke

Greenspan was known for his economic forecasting skills, having run a successful consulting firm,

Would routine exams of holding company subsidiaries by the Fed, as Ned had proposed, have made a difference? Probably yes, although the difference might not have been large,

bottom-up style of forecasting. He

I was dismayed to learn that the Labor Department's report on September employment, due out October 4, would be delayed by the shutdown.

Consequently, many viewed the subsequent decision on AIG as an inconsistent reversal, rather than what it was: a different response to different circumstances.

In buying Treasury securities, our ultimate goal was to precipitate a broad reduction in the cost of credit.†

Hank and I were accused of abusing our authority by allegedly forcing Bank of America to go through with the deal.

I told the other central bankers I appreciated their support. It was more than lip service. Each

that I couldn't blame the protesters for being dissatisfied.

In return, I tried to do Janet a favor by urging the assembled FOMC members to be more constructive and less strident in their public remarks.

I returned home feeling renewed gratitude for the sacrifices of our troops.

But Sheila came very close to characterizing anyone not fully in support of her plan as an opponent of foreclosure relief in general.

I feared at the time that avoiding the firm's failure might only delay the inevitable. Today

Going to Congress with a proposal only to have it turned down would devastate market confidence.

he was graciously evasive and said he wasn't certain he would have done anything different and that I was "doing an excellent job.

Larry is known for being blunt, to put it mildly, and he seemed to be warning against rescuing Bear.

years. That would give people a pretty good idea of where we were trying to steer the economy,

commentary focused on the unfairness of bailing out Wall Street (a sentiment with which I agreed) rather than on what would have happened had we not acted.

In March 2003 I began a series of speeches on the topic.

Tim and I had persuaded a reluctant Hank not to stand in the way of Dimon's higher offer.

I also believe that critics overstate the contribution of moral hazard from the Bear intervention to the resurgence of the crisis in the fall.

I took slight comfort from the fact that he hadn't said we had gone over the edge of our lawful power.

What he had was unqualified support from heavy hitters including former Treasury secretaries Larry Summers and Bob Rubin, as well as the chairman of the New York Fed's board—Pete Peterson, a former commerce secretary under

We discussed risks that European developments might pose to the United States, but to date those risks had not materialized.