Quotes About History

Under the Song dynasty, between 960 and 1279, China led the world in many technological innovatons. The Chinese invented clocks, the compass, gunpowder, paper and paper money, porcelein and the blast furnaces to make cast iron before Europe did. They independently developed spinning wheels and waterpower at more or less the same time that these merged at the other end of Eurosia.

Las diferencias institucionales más importantes que aparecieron tras la peste negra crearon el trasfondo en el que se producirían las divergencias más significativas entre Oriente y Occidente durante los siglos XVII, XVIII y XIX.

The outcome of political conflict is never certain, and even if in hindsight we see many historical events as inevitable, the path of history is contingent. Nevertheless, once in place, inclusive economic and political institutions tend to create a virtuous circle, a process of positive feedback, making it more likely that these institutions will persist and even expand.

Las coyunturas críticas en sí son puntos de inflexión históricos. Y los círculos viciosos y virtuosos implican que tenemos que estudiar la historia

El temor a la destrucción creativa es la razón principal por la que no hubo un aumento sostenido del nivel de vida entre la revolución neolítica y la revolución industrial

La desigualdad mundial existe actualmente porque, durante los siglos XIX y XX, algunos países fueron capaces de aprovechar la revolución industrial y las tecnologías y los métodos de organización que aportaba mientras que otros no.

La explicación histórica que hemos presentado hasta ahora indica que cualquier enfoque basado en el determinismo histórico (basado en geografía, cultura o incluso en otros factores históricos) es inadecuado. Las pequeñas diferencias y la casualidad no forman parte solamente

As we will see many times in this book, economies based on the repression of labor and systems such as slavery and serfdom are notoriously noninnovative. This is true from the ancient world to the modern era.

Until 1726 they had to wear specific markers, two concentric yellow rings for men and a striped veil for women. All Jews had to pay a special poll tax.

Rich nations are rich largely because they managed to develop inclusive institutions at some point during the past three hundred years.

1791 the French National Assembly emancipated French Jewry. The

But in many other cases, just the opposite takes place, and the process of political centralization also ushers in an era of greater absolutism.

Finally, we will also discuss how the failure of nations today is heavily influenced by their institutional histories, how much policy advice is informed by incorrect hypotheses and is potentially misleading, and how nations are still able to seize critical junctures and break the mold to reform their institutions and embark upon a path to greater prosperity.

The first place in the world to grant female suffrage was Wyoming in 1869, earning it the nickname the Equality State.

In fact, a thousand years of history and contemporary evidence make one thing abundantly clear: there is nothing automatic about new technologies bringing widespread prosperity. Whether they do or not is an economic, social, and political choice.

even if industry itself was very inefficiently organized relative to what could have been achieved. In fact, between 1928 and 1960 national income grew at 6 percent a year, probably the most rapid spurt of economic growth in history up until then.

A confluence of factors, in particular a critical juncture coupled with a broad coalition of those pushing for reform or other propitious existing institutions, is often necessary for a nation to make strides toward more inclusive institutions. In addition some luck is key, because history always unfolds in a contingent way.

The historical account we have presented so far indicates that any approach based on historical determinism—based on geography, culture, or even other historical factors—is inadequate. Small differences and contingency are not just part of our theory; they are part of the shape of history.

Many citizens in Rome did not need to work: they lived off the handouts from the government.

As the United States began to experience the Industrial Revolution in the first half of the nineteenth century, Mexico got poorer.

We have to understand why the politics of some societies lead to inclusive institutions that foster economic growth, while the politics of the vast majority of societies throughout history has led, and still leads today, to extractive institutions that hamper economic growth.

In England there was a long history of absolutist rule that was deeply entrenched and required a revolution to remove it. In the United States and Australia, there was no such thing. The inclusive institutions established in the United States and Australia meant that the Industrial Revolution spread quickly to these lands and they began to get rich.

The solution to the economic and political failure of nations today is to transform their extractive institutions toward inclusive ones. The vicious circle means that this is not easy. But it is not impossible, and the iron law of oligarchy is not inevitable. Either some preexisting inclusive elements in institutions, or the presence of broad coalitions leading the fight against the existing regime, or just the contingent nature of history, can break vicious circles.

Our brief review of the history of the Americas begins to give a sense of the forces that shape political and economic institutions. Different patterns of institutions today are deeply rooted in the past because once society gets organized in a particular way, this tends to persist. We'll show that this fact comes from the way that political and economic institutions interact. This