Quotes About Ontology

Y qué sería del vacío del espacio? Con demasiada frecuencia, el vacío aparece tan sólo como una falta. El vacío pasa entonces por una falta de algo que llene los espacios huecos y los intersticios. Sin embargo, el vacío está presumiblemente hermanado con el carácter peculiar del lugar y, por ello, no es un echar en falta, sino un producir.

Forma dat rei essentiam, materia existentiam.

To satisfy themselves with this, they gladly grasp at words, especially those which denote indefinite, very abstract, and unusual concepts difficult to explain, such, for example, as infinite and finite, sensuous and supersensuous, the Idea of being, Ideas of reason, the Absolute

C? îns? un patron absolut tic?los precum Hegel, a c?rui întreag? pseudofilozofare a fost de fapt o amplificare monstruoas? a argumentului ontologic, a c?utat s?-I apere pe acesta împotriva criticii lui Kant constituie o alian?? de care însuÅŸi argumentului ontologic i s-ar face ruÅŸine, oricât de puÅ£in are el de-a face cu ruÅŸinea.

The practice of mindfulness aims for a still and lucid engagement with the open field of contingent events in which one's life is embedded. All events are ontologically equivalent: mind is not more "real" than matter, nor matter more "real" than mind.

What Genesis is, in fact, is philosophy written in a deliberately non-philosophical way. It deals with all the central questions of philosophy: what exists (ontology), what can we know (epistemology), are we free (philosophical psychology), and how we should behave (ethics). But it does so in a way quite unlike the philosophical classics from Plato to Wittgenstein. To put it at its simplest: philosophy is truth as system. Genesis is truth as story.

In an entry from late 1979, Dick writes Heuristics is right on. The closer you get to reality the closer you get to (and to seeing) process. Q isn't "what is (esse)?" but "What does?" […] replace each "is" with "does" and ontology vanishes. All you have is a perpetually perturbed reality field! With a self-producing vortex.12

Plato will have to invent a transcendence that can be exercised and situated within the field of immanence itself. This is the meaning of the theory of Ideas.

Real?, adev?rat?, este doar devenirea îns??i, blocul de devenire, nu niÈ™te termeni presupuÈ™i ficÈ™i în care s-ar transforma cel care devine. ... Devenirea-animal a omului este real? f?r? ca animalul care devine omul s? fie real. ... o devenire nu are un subiect distinct de ea îns??i... (Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari)

The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term

I]maginability must not be made the test for ontology. The realist claim is that the scientist is discovering the structures of the world; it is not required in addition that these structures be imaginable in the categories of the macroworld.

Humans can no longer ignore nonhumans: they end up haunting the words we use and interrupting everyday talk.

'Do not touch ontologically' doesn't mean 'are separated by empirically measurable hard edges.'

To be is to be perceived (Esse est percipi)." Or, "If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there to hear it, does it make a sound?

A un certo punto c'è qualcosa che ci resiste. È quello che chiamo "inemendabilità", il carattere saliente del reale.

Per un castoro – possiamo averne una ragionevole certezza – i mutui e i divorzi non esistono, mentre le montagne e i laghi esistono eccome.

The stuff of which the world of our experience is composed is, in my belief, neither mind nor matter, but something more primitive than either. Both mind and matter seem to be composite, and the stuff of which they are compounded lies in a sense between the two, in a sense above them both, like a common ancestor.

Thus every principle of simplicity urges us to adopt the natural view, that there really are objects other than ourselves and our sense-data which have an existence not dependent upon our perceiving them.

Hence, two very difficult questions at once arise; namely, (1) Is there a real table at all? (2) If so, what sort of object can it be?

Hegel thought of the universe as a closely knit unity. His universe was like a jelly in the fact that, if you touched any one part of it, the whole quivered; but it was unlike a jelly in the fact that it could not really be cut up into parts. The appearance of consisting of parts, according to him, was a delusion.

very many philosophers, perhaps a majority, have held that there is nothing real except minds and their ideas. Such philosophers are called 'idealists'.

Only within metaphysics does logic exist.

The deduction reached by top modern philosophers on this question is that things exist for two reasons: they are either necessary or they were caused.

The most extreme of those who hold this opinion would go as far as declaring that, indeed, when no one and no thing is "looking" at or interacting with the moon in any way, it is not there.