Quotes About Financial

Soon it might make sense to leave rates where they were for a meeting or two while we assessed the economy's prospects.

Steve's and my presentation proved wrong because we did not take into account the possibility that losses on subprime mortgages could ultimately destabilize both the U.S. and global financial systems.

Moreover, the nation's banks seemed ready to withstand any spillover from housing.

AIG FP's risk was compounded by the difficulty in valuing its highly complex positions,

When concerns about Thornburg's assets surfaced, nervous repo lenders began to pull back.

But developing a cost-effective program, without being unfair to borrowers who had faithfully paid their mortgages, would take considerable time.

the borrower's collateral had to be sound enough that the Federal Reserve could reasonably expect full repayment.

might result only in banking activity moving out of the United States to foreign financial centers.

The company was so large and interconnected with the rest of the financial system that the ramifications of its failure would be massive, if hard to predict.

Unlike most other countries, the United States had required its banks to meet a minimum leverage ratio before the crisis, albeit at a relatively low level.

Some worried about appearing to overreact to what so far had been relatively modest market turmoil.

under Dodd's bill we would also have little role in ensuring systemic stability.

I argued that the Fed offered a unique mix of expertise and experience that couldn't be replicated soon, if ever, at a new financial stability agency.

Losing the authority to supervise smaller banks could create a dangerous blind spot.

it became a truly deep recession only after the panic reached its peak, in September and October 2008.

undertaken in conjunction with the Treasury and other bank regulators).

But, as we couldn't say often enough, we weren't doing this for Citi, its executives, its creditors, or anyone on Wall Street, but in the interest of overall economic and financial stability.

thereby serving as lender of last resort.

The only way to contain the economic damage of a financial fire is to put it out, even though it's almost impossible to do that without helping some of the people who caused it.

Even as the financial panic subsided in 2009, the damage done by the crisis became increasingly apparent.

I recommended that we hold off in spite of market expectations for a reduction.

The Federal Reserve, funded by earnings on our securities portfolio, remained open.

while the effect of Treasury purchases would be more broad-based.)

To ensure widespread participation, including by stronger banks, we needed the nation's leading banks to take part.