Quotes About Proliferation

I'm not concerned about weapons of mass destruction.

If the militarily most powerful - and least threatened - states need nuclear weapons for their security, how can one deny such security to countries that are truly insecure? The present nuclear policy is a recipe for proliferation. It is a policy for disaster.

To sum up, there is no evidence that a world without nuclear weapons would be a dangerous world. On the contrary, it would be a safer world, as I will show later.

Some day, somebody is going to have to start talking about what happens to us all a decade from now if we let these North Koreans and the Iranians go forward with their nuclear weapons program.

We have to get rid of those nuclear weapons.

And beyond that, the next issue is how do we guarantee one of these weapons, not necessarily this missile, but nuclear weapons ends up in the hands of Al Qaeda or some other terrorist group.

Proliferation of nuclear weapons to terrorist organisations is far more dangerous than proliferation of nuclear weapons to states, even states like North Korea.

As long as some of us choose to rely on nuclear weapons, we continue to risk that these same weapons will become increasingly attractive to others.

The larger picture here is that a North Korea with nuclear weapons adds to the larger proliferation risk.

You know, people have actually changed the way they think about nuclear weapons now, post-Cold War, post-9/11. The threat of nuclear weapons is not so much Russia attacking the United States, China. It's not a state-to-state - it's obviously terrorism; it's proliferation.

Russia is opposed to the proliferation of mass destruction weapons, including nuclear weapons, and in this context we call upon our Iranian friends to abandon the uranium enrichment programme.

If Iran obtains nuclear weapons, then almost certainly Saudi Arabia will do the same, as will Egypt, Turkey and perhaps others in the region.

President Obama has made it clear that the United States is determined to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

There's an abiding interest by the United States, by the American people, and by anybody with his eyes set in his head, to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

All nuclear material in weapons programmes must be subject one day to binding international verification.

I was profoundly moved to be the first United Nations Secretary-General to attend the Peace Memorial Ceremony in Hiroshima. I also visited Nagasaki. Sadly, we know the terrible humanitarian consequences from the use of even one weapon. As long as such weapons exist, so, too, will the risks of use and proliferation.

When we put an end to nuclear tests, we get closer to eliminating all nuclear weapons.

While the agreement provides a level of constraint on Iran's nuclear weapons program, it confers legitimacy on their nuclear threshold status, an unprecedented shift for a country with so many entanglements.

It's very difficult to convince other countries that they shouldn't pursue nuclear weapons programs if we ourselves are actively developing a component of a strategic defense system.

I believe we should be investing in the potential of nuclear technology based on thorium, to end the use of plutonium and lead to much safer nuclear power plants, less toxic nuclear waste, and less opportunities for nuclear weapons proliferation.

The Iran deal was working. As a solution to the problem of Iran developing nuclear weapons, it was actually working quite well.

Regulations grow at the same rate as weeds.

It is of the greatest importance that people and governments in many more countries than ours should realize that it is more dangerous to have access to nuclear arms than not to possess them.

Weeds triumphant ranged