Quotes About Thomas Aquinas

Objection 1: It would seem that there are more than three persons in God. For the plurality of persons in God arises from the plurality of the relative properties as stated above (A[1]). But there are four relations in God as stated above (Q[28], A[4]), paternity, filiation, common spiration, and procession. Therefore there are four persons in God.

Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is ever founded on good, as shown above (Q[48], A[3]). Therefore something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of some particular good. If it wholly escaped from the order of the Divine government, it would wholly cease to exist.

I answer that, The will can be changed in two ways. First, from within; in which way, since the movement of the will is nothing but the inclination of the will to the thing willed, God alone can thus change the will, because He gives the power of such an inclination to the intellectual nature. For as the natural inclination is from God alone Who gives the nature, so the inclination of the will is from God alone, Who causes the will.

So we must decide that anyone may entertain contrary opinions about the notions, if he does not mean to uphold anything at variance with faith. If, however, anyone should entertain a false opinion of the notions, knowing or thinking that consequences against the faith would follow, he would lapse into heresy.

It is not without reason that the Evangelist is careful to tell us the smallest details. For these two disciples signify two peoples, the Jews [by John] and the Gentiles [by Peter].

Human law does not prescribe concerning all the acts of every virtue: but only in regard to those that are ordainable to the common good—either immediately, as when certain things are done directly for the common good—or mediately, as when a lawgiver prescribes certain things pertaining to good order, whereby the citizens are directed in the upholding of the common good of justice and peace.

To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen to be false from the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and habitude.

Secondly, a thing is said to preserve another 'per se' and directly, namely, when what is preserved depends on the preserver in such a way that it cannot exist without it. In this manner all creatures need to be preserved by God. For the being of every creature depends on God, so that not for a moment could it subsist, but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by the operation of the Divine power, as Gregory says (Moral. xvi).

Reply to Objection 4: Even if by a special privilege their predestination were revealed to some, it is not fitting that it should be revealed to everyone; because, if so, those who were not predestined would despair; and security would beget negligence in the predestined.

Now the highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches in Metaph. xii.

Objection 1: It would seem that light is a body. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 5) that "light takes the first place among bodies."Therefore light is a body. Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. v, 2) that "light is a species of fire." But fire is a body, and therefore so is light.

Reply to Objection 3: It is not erroneous to say that men are transferred to the penalty of demons; but some erroneously stated that the demons are nothing but souls of the dead; and it is this that Chrysostom rejects.

Whether an angel can be in several places at once? Objection 1: It would seem that an angel can be in several places at once. For an angel is not less endowed with power than the soul. But the soul is in several places at once, for it is entirely in every part of the body, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi). Therefore an angel can be in several places at once.

Reply to Objection 5: As was said above, the parts of the universe are ordered to each other, according as one acts on the other, and according as one is the end and exemplar of the other. But, as was said above, this can only happen to evil as joined to some good. Hence evil neither belongs to the perfection of the universe, nor does it come under the order of the same, except accidentally, that is, by reason of some good joined to it.

Reply to Objection 3: From effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii): "God speaks to the angels by the very fact that He shows to their hearts His hidden and invisible things." But this is to enlighten them. Therefore, whenever God speaks, He enlightens. In the same way every angelic speech is an enlightening. Therefore an inferior angel can in no way speak to a superior angel.

On the contrary, The Philosopher holds the intellect to be the higher power than the intellect.

The definition that "Truth is the equation of thought and thing" is applicable to it under either aspect.

yet so that envy is not to be taken for a passion, but for a will resisting the good of another.

The existence of a prime mover- nothing can move itself; there must be a first mover. The first mover is called God.

Frederick agreed that the punishment of La Barre was extreme; for his part he would rather have condemned the youth to read the entire Summa theologica of Thomas Aquinas; this, he thought, would be a fate worse than death.

It is possible to demonstrate God's existence, although not a priori, yet a posteriori from some work of His more surely known to us.

God should not be called an individual substance, since the principal of individuation is matter.

The splendor of a soul in grace is so seductive that it surpasses the beauty of all created things.