Quotes About Knowledge

To what a degree this loose mode of classing and denominating objects has rendered the vocabulary of mental and moral philosophy unfit for the purposes of accurate thinking, is best known to whoever has most meditated on the present condition of those branches of knowledge.

He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that. His reasons may be good, and no one may have been able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side; if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion.

define logic as the science which treats of the operations of the human understanding in the pursuit of truth.

The test of real and vigorous thinking, the thinking which ascertains truths instead of dreaming dreams, is successful application to practice.

It is true that a great statesman is he who knows when to depart from traditions, as well as when to adhere to them. But it is a great mistake to suppose that he will do this better for being ignorant of the traditions.

It is safe to say that the knowledge men can acquire of women, even as they have been and are—never mind what they could be—is wretchedly incomplete and superficial, and that it always will be so until women themselves have told all that they have to tell.

There are many truths of which the full meaning cannot be realised, until personal experience has brought it home

We are next informed that bookworms, a term which seems to be held applicable to whoever has the smallest tincture of book-knowledge, may not be good at bodily exercises, or have the habits of gentlemen. This is a very common line of remark with dunces of condition; but whatever the dunces may think, they have no monopoly of either gentlemanly habits or bodily activity.

What the State can usefully do is to make itself a central depository, and active circulator and diffuser, of the experience resulting from many trials. Its business is to enable each experimentalist to benefit by the experiments of others, instead of tolerating no experiments but its own.

Truths are known to us in two ways: some are known directly, and of themselves; some through the medium of other truths. The former are the subject of Intuition, or Consciousness; 4 the latter, of Inference.

We know how easily the uselessness of almost every branch of knowledge may be proved to the complete satisfaction of those who do not possess it.

Az igazság többet nyer azoknak a tévedéseivel, akik kellÅ' felkészülés után a maguk fejével gondolkodnak, mint azoknak az igaz vélekedéseivel, akik csupán azért vélekednek így, mert nem hajlandók magukat gondolkodással gyötörni.

Banyak kebenaran yang baru kita sadari maknanya setelah kita alami sendiri.

Their conclusion may be true, but it might be false for anything they know: they have never thrown themselves into the mental position of those who think differently from them, and considered what such persons may have to say; and consequently they do not, in any proper sense of the word, know the doctrine which they themselves profess.

And if several of the more difficult sciences are still [pg 023] in so defective a state; if not only so little is proved, but disputation has not terminated even about the little which seemed to be so; the reason perhaps is, that men's logical notions have not yet acquired the degree of extension, or of accuracy, requisite for the estimation of the evidence proper to those particular departments of knowledge.

Examples of truths known to us by immediate consciousness, are our own bodily sensations and mental feelings. I know directly, and of my own knowledge, that I was vexed yesterday, or that I am hungry to-day.

there is a commoner case than either of these; when the conflicting doctrines, instead of being one true and the other false, share the truth between them; and the nonconforming opinion is needed to supply the remainder of the truth, of which the received doctrine embodies only a part.

It may be objected that the meaning of names can guide us at most only to the opinions, possibly the foolish and groundless opinions, which mankind have formed concerning things, and that as the object of philosophy is truth, not opinion, the philosopher should dismiss words and look into things themselves, to ascertain what questions can be asked and answered in regard to them.

toda época ha sostenido opiniones que las épocas posteriores han demostrado ser, no sólo falsas, sino absurdas;

Thorough knowledge of one another hardly ever exists, but between persons who, besides being intimates, are equals.

A cultivated mind—I do not mean that of a philosopher, but any mind to which the fountains of knowledge have been opened, and which has been taught, in any tolerable degree, to exercise its faculties—finds sources of inexhaustible interest in all that surrounds it; in the objects of nature, the achievements of art, the imaginations of poetry, the incidents of history, the ways of mankind past and present, and their prospects in the future.

Questions of ultimate ends do not admit of proof, in the ordinary acceptation of the term. To be incapable of proof by reasoning is common to all first principles; to the first premises of our knowledge, as well as to those of our conduct.

É melhor ser Sócrates insatisfeito do que um porco satisfeito; é melhor ser Sócrates insatisfeito que um imbecil satisfeito. E, se o imbecil ou o porco são de opinião diferente, é que só conhecem um lado da questão: o deles. A outra parte, para fazer a comparação, conhece os dois lados.

Ä°nsan hatalar?n? tart??ma ve deneyim yoluyla düzeltebilir. Yaln?zca deneyimle deÄŸil. Tart??ma da olmak zorundad?r ki deneyimin nas?l yorumlanaca?? gösterilebilsin.