Quotes About Goodness

Ser bom pode não ser agradável, 6655321. Pode ser horrível ser bom. E quando digo isto a você, eu compreendo como soa contraditório. Eu sei que vou passar muitas noites sem dormir por causa disto. O que é que Deus quer? Deus quer a bondade ou a escolha da bondade? O homem que escolhe o mal é talvez de uma certa forma melhor do que aquele a quem a bondade é imposta.

Iyi bir insan olmak çok da hoÅŸ olmayabilir. Iyi bir insan olmak korkunç olabilir. Bunu sana söylerken, kulaÄŸa ne kadar çeliÅŸkili geldiÄŸini biliyorum...Tanr? ne ister? Tanr? iyilik mi ister yoksa iyi olma seçeneÄŸini mi? KötülüÄŸü seçen bir insan, kendisine iyilik dayat?lm?? bir insandan baz? aç?lardan daha üstün olabilir mi?

Ä°yilik seçilemeyen bir ÅŸeydir. Ä°nsan seçemediÄŸinde insanl?ktan ç?kar. (syf. 73 – 74)

Toplumun onaylad??? eylemlerin d???na ç?kam?yorsun, sadece iyilik yapabilen küçük bir makinesin. Ayr?ca ÅŸu marjinal koÅŸullanmalar meselesinin… içyüzünü aç?kça görüyorum. Müzik ve cinsellik, edebiyat ve sanat, art?k bunlar haz deÄŸil ac? veriyordur herhalde. (syf. 136 – 137)

It may not be nice to be good, little 6655321. It may be horrible to be good. And when I say that to you I realize how self-contradictory that sounds. I know I shall have many sleepless nights about this. What does God want? Does God want woodness (goodness) or the choice of goodness? Is a man who chooses the bad perhaps in some ways better than a man who has the good imposed upon him?

Tanr? biz kullar?ndan ne istiyor? Tanr?'n?n istediÄŸi iyilik mi yoksa iyiliÄŸi seçebilme ÅŸans?na sahip olabilmek mi? KötülüÄŸü seçen biri gerçekte iyiliÄŸe zorlanan birinden daha m? geçerli Tanr?'n?n gözünde?

Non si chiedono mica qual è la causa della bontà, e allora perchè il contrario?

Tanr? ne ister? Tanr? iyilik mi ister yoksa iyi olma seçeneÄŸini mi? KötülüÄŸü seçen bir insan, kendisine iyilik dayat?lm?? bir insandan baz? aç?lardan daha üstün olabilir mi? (syf. 84)

Goodness comes from within. Goodness is something chosen. When a man cannot choose he ceases to be a man.

tanr?n?n istediÄŸi iyilik mi yoksa iyiliÄŸi seçebilme ÅŸans?na sahip olabilmek mi? kötülüÄŸü seçen biri gerçekte iyiliÄŸe zorlanan birinden daha m? geçerli tanr?n?n gözünde?

What does God want? Does God want woodness or the choice of goodness? Is a man who chooses the bad perhaps in some way better than a man who has the good imposed upon him?

Bu dünyaya s?rt Tanr?'yla baÄŸlant? kurmaya getirilmediniz. Böyle ÅŸeyler insan?n tüm gücünü ve iyiliÄŸini yok edebilir. (syf. 3)

The author now leaves him in the hands of his readers: not as a hero, not as a man to be admired and talked of, not as a man who should be toasted at public dinners and spoken of with conventional absurdity as a perfect divine, but as a good man, without guile, believing humbly in the religion which he has striven to teach, and guided by the precepts which he has striven to learn.

All brave things do good, even if we don't see it.

It may be a procession of faithful failures that enriches the soil of godly success. Faithful actions are not religious acts. They are not even necessary actions undertaken by people of faith. Faithful actions, whether they are marked by success or they end in failure, are actions that are compelled by goodness.

The true notion is that the material universe is a sign or an indication of what God is. We look at the purity of the snowflake and we see something of the goodness of God. The world is full of poetry: it is sin which turns it into prose.

He is happy who lives in accordance with complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with external goods, not for some chance period but throughout a complete life.

It is well said, then, that it is by doing just acts that the just man is produced, and by doing temperate acts the temperate man; without doing these no one would have even a prospect of becoming good.

Since the branch of philosophy on which we are at present engaged differs from the others in not being a subject of merely intellectual interest — I mean we are not concerned to know what goodness essentially is, but how we are to become good men, for this alone gives the study its practical value — we must apply our minds to the solution of the problems of conduct.

No more will there be any difference between 'the ideal good' and 'good' in so far as both are good.

And so the good man ought to be Self-loving: because by doing what is noble he will have advantage himself and will do good to others: but the bad man ought not to be, because he will harm himself and his neighbours by following low and evil passions. In the case of the bad man, what he ought to do and what he does are at variance, but the good man does what he ought to do, because all Intellect chooses what is best for itself and the good man puts himself under the direction of Intellect.

For 'activity in conformity with virtue' involves virtue.

good character is the indispensable condition and chief determinant of happiness, itself the goal of all human doing.

Any polis which is truly so called, and is not merely one in name, must devote itself to the end of encouraging goodness. Otherwise, political association sinks into a mere alliance.