Quotes About Bernanke

But many voters evidently saw the issue as favoring irresponsible borrowers at the expense of the responsible.

he was graciously evasive and said he wasn't certain he would have done anything different and that I was "doing an excellent job.

Nevertheless, I do not want the notion that Lehman's failure could have been avoided, and that its failure was consequently a policy choice, to become the received wisdom, for the simple reason that it is not true.

although the European banks that eagerly bought securitized subprime loans were hardly blameless.)

since Hank would be the one persuading Congress to act, his views deserved some deference.

Larry is known for being blunt, to put it mildly, and he seemed to be warning against rescuing Bear.

Greenspan had come to the same conclusion.

Once again, the president expressed his full support for us.

It soon became clear that, without outside help, Greece would default.

years. That would give people a pretty good idea of where we were trying to steer the economy,

it accounted for only a tiny share of eurozone trade and investment.

In Hank's proposal, this broad role would fall to the Fed,

If defaults spread beyond Greece, the stability of Europe's entire banking system could be at risk.

The principles in his speech seemed sensible and pragmatic to me.

When not consulting or traveling to speak at meetings and conferences, I work on various projects at the Brookings Institution

also worried about possible spillover effects,

I took slight comfort from the fact that he hadn't said we had gone over the edge of our lawful power.

But before Congress had an opportunity to give serious consideration to these issues, Lehman had failed,

Mankiw himself had ignited a short-lived media controversy by speaking favorably about outsourcing jobs to other countries

At the polite but firm request of the security team, I had not driven a car in seven months.

Fortunately, permanent staff members provided continuity.

we offered guidance, albeit vague, on our own expectations for monetary policy. We

I had a friendly, though not particularly close, relationship with President Bush.

As doubts grew about the GSEs,