Quotes from Ben S. Bernanke

but Anna could see the benefits of her efforts much more concretely and immediately in the progress and joy of her students.

In any case, the change in our language seemed to work.

which would be responsible for managing the loans and would be on the hook for any losses.

I was also dismayed that some people who had known or worked with me—like Reinhart, Posen, and Goodfriend—seemed disinclined to give us the benefit of the doubt.

We wanted to act before we were forced to do so by a run.

In truth, she had far more experience in Fed policymaking than I had had on taking office.

were squeezed into corners of the table,

I know it's hard to think of a $787 billion package as small, but its size must be compared with its objective of helping to arrest the deepest recession in seventy years in a $15 trillion U.S. economy.

From that point forward, my mission was to ensure a smooth transition.

In buying Treasury securities, our ultimate goal was to precipitate a broad reduction in the cost of credit.†

might reduce the stigma of borrowing from the Fed.

much of the effect was offset by spending cuts and tax increases undertaken by state and local governments.

the hawks and doves alike exuded pessimism.

lower long-term interest rates (to stimulate spending and investment) and raise short-term rates (to protect the value of the dollar, supposedly).

Waiting seemed the wiser course.

Uncertainty can also be bad for the economy as a whole if, for example, firms delay capital investment or hiring until they have more information about their access to foreign suppliers and markets.

Hank and I were accused of abusing our authority by allegedly forcing Bank of America to go through with the deal.

because it takes time to conduct an auction and determine the winning bids, borrowers would receive their funds with a delay, making clear that they were not desperate for cash.

It was hard to ignore that kind of talk, and I worried that people would be misled by the absurd claims and charges

Recessions can be triggered by many causes, or combinations of causes.

I told the other central bankers I appreciated their support. It was more than lip service. Each

Despite those tensions, the G-7 representatives were determined to work together. Too much was at stake for the group to leave Washington without at least the outlines of a coordinated response.

I knew it was a hard sell, but I wanted the idea to remain under consideration.

We all knew that we would meet those challenges more effectively if we worked together rather than operating in isolation.