Quotes from Ben S. Bernanke

Not every new chair would be comfortable with such a strong number two. The

in part because financial crises are (fortunately) rare enough that relevant data are scarce.

If a means of saving Lehman did exist, given the tools then available, we were not clever enough to think of it during those frenetic days.

Demonstrating her self-confidence, Janet had pushed the administration to nominate Stan, a choice that I strongly supported. Not every new chair would be comfortable with such a strong number two. The

In discussing the challenges he and his team faced, Stockton reminded us of 1998,

We lacked the means to do so.

We were more likely to see an unfair or inaccurate story from journalists who did not usually cover the Fed and were, consequently, less well informed.

Wealthy people own more stocks and real estate than the nonwealthy.

I had presided at similar events many times but wasn't used to being on the receiving end of so many kind remarks.

part of our mistake in 1998 was a failure to appreciate just how strong the U.S. economy was

I can only say that the Goldman alumni with whom I worked brought not only substantial financial expertise to their government duties, as one would expect, but also a strong dedication to the public interest.

You remained determined, open-minded, and creative in your effort to do what was best for the country.

that letting Lehman go was a choice rather than an unavoidable outcome.

Lloyd was obviously very bright, and I found his insights into market developments particularly useful.

which would lead to further weakening in housing,

interest. It looked like negotiations would wrap up over the weekend.

Ultimately, its program looked similar to ours, both in its emphasis on government bond purchases and in its size relative to the economy.

The better way to look at the distributional effect of monetary policy is to compare changes in the income flowing from capital investments with the income from labor.

that would simultaneously let investors who had misjudged risk off the hook. Richard

We needed a more comprehensive solution to the crisis,

Although FOMC members, hawks and doves alike, agreed it was time to wind down our emergency lending programs, they differed on when to begin rolling back our accommodative monetary policy.

As it turns out, easier monetary policy tends to affect capital and labor incomes fairly similarly.

Hank was initially noncommittal. He knew that he and his team would have to lead the effort to develop a legislative proposal and sell it to Congress.

In return, I tried to do Janet a favor by urging the assembled FOMC members to be more constructive and less strident in their public remarks.