Quotes from Daniel Yergin

General Motors sells more cars in China than in the United States. Before the Trump trade war, up to 60 percent of U.S. soybean exports went to China, and Apple sold $40 billion a year of iPhones. China was also expected to become the biggest market for U.S. LNG.

When Donald Trump became president, he changed the setting on the table. No longer, in the view of his administration, is China an economic partner, albeit a challenging one. Now it is an economic adversary as well as a strategic rival.

Between 2006 and 2013, Chinese gas consumption had tripled. Yet despite the decade of negotiations, the "big deal" on gas was mainly stuck on one question—price. Moscow wanted prices commensurate with what it charged Europeans and indexed to oil (which was still high), while Beijing wanted lower prices in line with domestic energy prices and competitive with coal.

The "triad"—the convergence of electric vehicles, ride hailing, and self-driving cars—is far from sure.

announcement of the big deal—valued at $400 billion over thirty years. The contract would make China the second-largest market for Russian gas, after Germany. The Chinese would also provide the financing for a massive new $45 billion, thirteen-hundred-mile "Power of Siberia" gas pipeline. "This will be the biggest construction project in the world for the next four years, without exaggeration," Putin said after the signing.

Xi Jinping's first stop on his first foreign trip as president in 2013 was Moscow. China became Russia's largest trading partner. The respective roles were very clear. China provided manufactures, consumer goods, and finance; Russia, oil, gas, coal, and other commodities—and geopolitical alignment.

the $25 billion, 2,800-mile ESPO (Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean) oil pipeline. In 2005, just 5 percent of Russia's oil exports went to China. It rose to almost 30 percent, and Russia eclipsed Saudi Arabia as China's number one supplier.

objective, it said, was to push Gulf into transferring half of its U.S. oil and gas reserves into a royalty trust, which would be owned directly by the stockholders, giving them the cash flow and eliminating the double taxation on dividends.

Almost a year later, in the summer of 2019, the Russians and Chinese began joint air patrols in the Pacific.

Beijing's "Made in China" 2025 strategy, enunciated in 2017, aims to make China a leader in ten high-tech industries.

achieving the objectives of the two-degree world. Pension funds and other investors are now pressing energy companies to explain how their strategies and profitability would fare under the terms of the 2015 Paris Agreement.

For four decades, U.S. energy policy was dominated—and its foreign policy hobbled—by the specter of shortage and vulnerability

in a manner reminiscent of the British and German battleships before World War I, fifth-generation cellular—5G—along with Huawei has become in this era the embodiment of the new rivalry.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo would subsequently put it differently—that the shale revolution has provided the United States with a flexibility in international affairs that it had not had for decades.

Yet, while energy transition has become a pervasive theme all around the world, disagreement rages, both within countries and among them, on the nature of the transition: how it unfolds, how long it takes, and who pays. "Energy transition" certainly means something very different to a developing country such as India, where hundreds of millions of impoverished people do not have access to commercial energy, than to Germany or the Netherlands.

Over two years, the Chinese Development Bank extended $47 billion in credit to keep money-losing Chinese companies afloat.

Disruptions of supply affect the global system into which America is so integrated—with almost 30 percent of U.S. GDP and close to 40 million jobs resulting from trade with the rest of the world.

The focus in the pages of this book is on how the momentum of climate policies—powered by research and observation, by climate models, and by political mobilization and regulatory power, social activism, financial institutions, and deepening anxiety—will transform the energy system. "Net zero carbon" will be one of the great challenges of the decades ahead, not just politically but also in how people live their lives and in the costs of achieving it.

Between the end of the Great Recession, in June 2009, and 2019, net fixed investment in the oil and gas extraction sector represented more than two-thirds of total U.S. net industrial investment. In another measure, between 2009 and 2019, the increases in oil and gas have accounted for 40 percent of the cumulative growth in U.S. industrial production.

For the coronavirus has fueled a retreat that had already begun from globalization and from the international institutions and cooperation that have underpinned it. In 2008–2009, international collaboration was key to conquering the financial contagion. A dozen years later, such cooperation at the governmental and international level in fighting the contagion of the virus was notable by its absence.

Earthquakes were another concern, particularly after swarms were felt in Oklahoma. Follow-on studies attributed these quakes not to drilling but rather to disposing of wastewater in inappropriate locations, causing slippage of rock formations and thus quakes.

consequence of the global economic misery from the pandemic of 2020 could be greater prevalence of fragile and failed states, which would create new security challenges that, at some point, would reach beyond their borders. Yet governments would be hampered in responding to domestic and international needs, whether around security or health or energy and climate, by the huge debt and fiscal armor they have assumed in battling to preserve their economies.

It took two phone calls in 2009 to convince Charif Souki to turn around the business he was trying to build.

Currently, oil use in the developed world averages 14 barrels per person per year. In the developing world, it is only 3 barrels per person. How will the world cope when billions of people go from 3 barrels to 6 barrels per person?