Quotes About Phenomenology

to what Derrida, following Husserl, calls "the relation to the object" [84])

Something similar is still true of the courses followed by manifold intuitions which together make up the unity of one continuous consciousness of one and the same object.

What is experienced from within cannot be categorized in concepts that have been developed for the external world of the senses.

In the case of lived experience, there is no difference between an object that is perceived and the eye that perceives it.

There's a special phenomenology to walking in woods in winter.

I am a spectator, so to speak, of the molecular whirlwind which men call individual life; I am conscious of an incessant metamorphosis, an irresistible movement of existence, which is going on within me -- and this phenomenology of myself serves as a window opened upon the mystery of the world.

The appearance of the other in the world corresponds therefore to a congealed sliding of the whole universe.

The bond between being and non-being can be only internal. It is within being qua being that non-being must arise, and within non-being that being must spring up; and this relation can not be a fact, a natural law, but an upsurge of the being which is its own nothingness of being.

All these objects... how can I explain? They inconvenienced me; I would have liked the to exist less strongly, more dryly, in a more abstract way, with more reserve.

I exist. It's sweet, so sweet, so slow. And light: you'd think it floated all by itself. It stirs. It brushes by me, melts and vanishes. Gently, gently. There is bubbling water in my mouth. I swallow. It slides down my throat, it caresses me-and now it comes up again into my mouth. For ever I shall have a little pool of whitish water in my mouth-lying low-grazing my tongue. And this pool is still me. And the tongue. And the throat is me.

If Hilbert's view prevails over intuitionism, as appears to be the case, then I see in this a decisive defeat of the philosophical attitude of pure phenomenology, which thus proves to be insufficient for the understanding of creative science even in the area of cognition that is most primal and most readily open to evidence – mathematics.

Tarih, var olmuÅŸ olan bir ÅŸeyden söz eder; oysa bir var olan baÅŸka bir var olan?n varoluÅŸunu hakl? ç?karamaz.

For instance, there is something new about my hands, a certain way of picking up my pipe or fork. Or else it's the fork which now has a certain way of having itself picked up, I don't know. A little while ago, just as I was coming into my room, I stopped short because I felt in my hand a cold object which held my attention through a sort of personality. I opened my hand, looked: I was simply holding the door-knob.

Peirce's foundational, scientific metaphysics accordingly begins with phenomenology, the way things are presented to us in experience. He is particularly concerned with the difference between belief and doubt.

Psychologically experienced consciousness is therefore no longer pure consciousness; construed Objectively in this way, consciousness itself becomes something transcendent, becomes an event in that spatial world which appears, by virtue of consciousness, to be transcendent.

We were straightfacedly told that, to understand the Phenomenology and the Encyclopædia, we had to go back to Abraham, Isaac, and the desert. Today it is all too obvious this sort of exegesis was merely a manoeuvre.

It was closely printed in long paragraphs that mostly seemed to begin, "If we extrapolate from our findings in my earlier work, we find ourselves ready to approach an extension of the paratypical phenomenology…" No, Charmain thought. I don't think we are ready.

Experience by itself is not science.

Las palabras no se parecen a las cosas que designan (Maurice Merleau-Ponty)

The French phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty says the body is not an object to think about. Rather, it is a grouping of lived-through meanings, which move towards equilibrium.

This turns on the lived experiences of individuals and how they have both subjective experiences of the phenomenon and objective experiences of something in common with other people. Thus, there is a refusal of the subjective–objective perspective, and for these reasons, phenomenology lies somewhere on a continuum between qualitative and quantitative research.

Phenomenology is not only a description but it is also an interpretive process in which the researcher makes an interpretation of the meaning of the lived experiences.

On this view, it is not only how we die—or face the prospect of our mortality, as phenomenologists like to say—but also how we inhabit language that singularizes us, that gives our identities a distinctive resonance.

Thus "phenomenology" means ???????????? ?? ????????? -- to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.