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were growing increasingly skeptical of Lehman's judgment of the value of its holdings.

Not surprisingly, this voluntary arrangement was less strict than one required by law might have been.

Tim was the Fed's principal contact with Fuld.

now his not-so-secret ambition was to be chairman of the Fed after my departure.

I didn't want to influence his choice too much, since my support for any one candidate could easily be misrepresented as opposition to another.

I thought we should be willing to offer advice, at least in private, if it would be helpful and

To me, the need for continuing with these purchases remained clear.

But the vote didn't capture the extent of the concern and skepticism on the Committee.

He too greeted me warmly and praised the Fed's response to the crisis.

It was not a new argument, but Jeremy made it in more detail and in a particularly sophisticated way.

Jay expressed his concerns mostly within the Fed, as did Betsy. Sandy,

King gave me an important piece of information: He

I saw little evidence of an emerging consensus in favor of them and widespread confusion about how they would work.

Given the seriousness of the threat posed to global financial stability by a Lehman bankruptcy,

Our whole strategy was based on finding a buyer,

But the end of tightening seemed in sight.

That dynamic would doom our efforts to failure.

was not subject to oversight by insurance regulators.

In worrying about the practical aspects of the plan more than political considerations, I may have been tone-deaf.

but it was another source of concern.

Perhaps my low-key approach hurt us politically, but I was not comfortable proceeding in any other way.

and it might even be the key to preventing the economy from sliding back into recession.

I made clear that I thought the benefits of our securities purchases had so far outweighed the risks.

McCain, despite having asked for the meeting, seemed unwilling to work actively for a solution.