Quotes About Quote

and I didn't expect any meaningful economic damage.

He and his company were caught up in a panic not

The failure of this firm was unlikely to have a broad economic impact, and so we believed a 13(3) loan was not justified.

the requirement also limited the interventions available to the Fed.

in the absence of international coordination those rules might be inconsistent with U.S. standards,

The decision would depend on economic developments, especially on the persistence of inflation.

a sign that investors weren't shunning the mortgage securities to the extent that they had been.

Still, given the circumstances and our rapidly shrinking options, it seemed the best solution.

our purchases would prove highly profitable for taxpayers.

Whether Wells would return to the negotiations, and if so on what terms, was unclear.

But Citi had problems of its own and wanted the FDIC to limit the losses it might inherit from Wachovia.

I also pressed the issue at congressional hearings.

I agree that more should have been done to help homeowners, although devising effective policies to do that was more difficult than many appreciate.

In fact, despite my understated style, I was as aggressive on this issue as on any during my time in Washington.

JPMorgan was unwilling on its own to stand behind it.

something that I had been advocating since I arrived at the Fed in 2002. In

Tim's departure would be a significant loss to the Fed.

and stood ready to serve as a lender of last resort if needed.

had been a principal reason behind Citi's pursuit of Wachovia.

which she feared would do more harm than good.

With Bear's securities as collateral, JPMorgan would then lend the Fed's cash to Bear.

Her instincts were too populist for us to see eye to eye on policy, however,

letting Citi go was not an option.

It was one authority I was happy to lose.